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Is the U.S. Current Account 
Deﬁcit Sustainable? If Not, How
Costly Is Adjustment Likely to Be?
MANY ANALYSTS IN academia, the private sector, and applied research
institutions express increasing concern about the growing U.S. current
account deficit. There is a general sense that current global imbalances
are unsustainable and that adjustment must come sooner rather than later.
The unprecedented magnitude of the U.S. current account deficit and
the United States’ growing net foreign indebtedness have fueled these
worries, with many analysts arguing that, unless something is done, the
world will move toward a major ﬁnancial crisis.
1 Some have gone as far
as to suggest an imminent collapse of the dollar and a global ﬁnancial
meltdown.
2 Underlying this view is the fact that, if the deficit continues
at its current level, U.S. net international liabilities will eventually reach
100 percent of GDP, a ﬁgure widely considered to be excessively large.
3
The source of ﬁnancing of the U.S. current account deﬁcit has also
become a matter of concern. A number of authors have argued that, by
relying on foreign and particularly Asian central banks’ purchases of
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1. Although most of these alarmist discussions have taken the form of newspaper opin-
ion pieces, there have also been a few policy papers on the subject. See, for example,
Roubini and Setser (2004).
2. See, for example, Roubini and Setser (2004). For an excellent set of papers on the
subject, see Bergsten and Williamson (2004).
3. For example, in a very clear discussion of this issue, Michael Mussa said, “[T]here
probably is a practical upper limit for US net external liabilities at something less than 100
percent of US GDP and, accordingly . . . current account deﬁcits of 5 percent or more of US
GDP are not indeﬁnitely sustainable” (Mussa, 2004, p. 114).Treasury securities, the United States has become extremely vulnerable to
sudden changes in expectations and economic sentiments.
4
Robert Skidelsky recently argued in the New York Times that the value
of the dollar is one of the most important sources of political tension
between the United States and Europe. Arguing that “[U]nilateralism is
not more acceptable in currency matters than in foreign policy,” Skidel-
sky points out that,
The United States is the only major country proclaiming itself indifferent to its
currency’s value. In countries running persistent current account deﬁcits, gov-
ernments normally—indeed must—reduce domestic consumption. But so far,
the United States has relied on other countries to adjust their economies to prof-
ligate American spending. . . .5
There is, however, an alternative view. Some authors have argued that,
in an era of increasing ﬁnancial globalization and rapid U.S. productivity
gains, it is possible—indeed, even logical and desirable—for the United
States to run very large current account deﬁcits for a very long period
(say, a quarter of a century). In this view, growing international portfolio
diversiﬁcation implies that the rest of the world will be willing to accu-
mulate large U.S. liabilities during the next few years, maybe even in
excess of 100 percent of U.S. GDP. From this perspective, since the U.S.
current account deﬁcit poses no threat, there are no fundamental reasons
to justify a signiﬁcant fall in the value of the dollar. 
6
This paper analyzes the relationship between the dollar and the U.S.
current account, with particular attention to the issue of sustainability
and the mechanics of current account adjustment. I develop a portfolio
model of the current account and show that, even under a very positive
scenario where foreigners’ (net) demand for U.S. assets doubles from its
current level, the U.S. current account will have to go through a signifi-
cant adjustment in the not-too-distant future. Indeed, one cannot rule out
a scenario where the U.S. current account deficit shrinks abruptly by 
3 to 6 percent of GDP. To get an idea of the possible consequences of
such an adjustment, I also analyze the international historical evidence
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4. See, for example, Martin Wolf’s article in the Financial Times, “Funding America’s
Recovery is a Very Dangerous Game,” October 1, 2003, p. 15.
5. “Winning Back Europe’s Heart: Rogue Dollar,” New York Times, February 20,
2005, p. 9.
6. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004a, 2004b); see also Cooper (2004) and
Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2004).on current account reversals. The results of this empirical investigation
indicate that significant current account reversals have tended to result
in large declines in GDP growth.
The U.S. Dollar and the Current Account:
A Thirty-Year Perspective
This section analyzes the behavior of the U.S. real exchange rate
(RER) and current account since the adoption of ﬂoating exchange rates
in the early 1970s.
7 I begin by discussing the course of the U.S. RER and
current account during that period and the changing nature of the U.S.
trade-weighted RER index. I argue that the last thirty years of U.S. RER
behavior can be divided into six distinct phases. Second, I discuss the
most recent data on the U.S. current account, including its sources of
ﬁnancing. And third, I provide some international evidence on current
account imbalances during the last three decades. This comparative
analysis helps in placing the recent U.S. experience in historical context.
Six Phases of Real Exchange Rate Behavior
Figure 1 presents quarterly data for the U.S. current account balance as
a percentage of GDP and for the Federal Reserve’s trade-weighted index
of the U.S. RER, both for the period 1973–2004; in this ﬁgure, as in the
rest of the paper, the RER index is deﬁned such that an increase represents
a real appreciation. The ﬁgure shows that current account deﬁcits have
become increasingly large since 1992. It also shows that, over the ﬁrst
decade of ﬂoating exchange rates (1973–82), the United States ran small
current account surpluses or deﬁcits, which averaged to a small surplus of
0.04 percent of GDP. In contrast, over 1983–2004 the current account bal-
ance was in deﬁcit, on average, by 2.4 percent of GDP. Figure 1 also
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7. Because of space considerations, I do not discuss in detail some important issues
such as the stationarity of the RER and its (changing) volatility through time. Most recent
analyses based on panel data have found that the RER is stationary and that its half-life
cycle is less than the three to ﬁve years traditionally considered to be the consensus view.
See Choi, Mark, and Sul (2004). An analysis of U.S. RER volatility indicates that for the
complete period 1975–2004 the U.S. RER index exhibited one of the highest volatilities in
the sample. Only the British pound, the Japanese yen, and the euro had greater volatility.
Within this period, the RER volatility of the U.S. dollar was at its highest in 1985–89,
which roughly corresponds to phase III (a period of rapid depreciation) in ﬁgure 2.shows that during the whole period under consideration the RER index
ﬂuctuated within a wide range: from 91.2 at its lowest point, it rose to
136.3 at its highest, with a mean for the period of 105.3. Finally, the ﬁg-
ure demonstrates an apparent negative correlation between the trade-
weighted real value of the dollar and the current account balance: periods
of a strong dollar have tended to coincide with periods of larger current
account deﬁcits. Although the relationship is not exact, the synchronicity
between the two variables is quite high: the contemporaneous coefﬁcient
of correlation between the logarithm of the RER index and the current
account balance is −0.53; the highest value for the correlation coefﬁcient
(−0.60) is obtained when the log of the RER is lagged three quarters.
Recent policy debates about the value of the dollar illustrate the massive
changes that have occurred in U.S. trade relations during the last three
decades. Discussions of the dollar in the early 1970s dealt almost exclu-
sively with bilateral exchange rates—both nominal and real—between
the dollar and the currencies of other industrial countries; more recently
the debate has increasingly focused on the dollar’s value in terms of the
currencies of emerging economies, including the Chinese renminbi, the
Korean won, and the Malaysian ringgit. During the last few years the
Mexican peso has also become an important determinant of the trade-
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, International Transactions Accounts; Federal 
Reserve data.
a. Price-adjusted Major Currencies index.
Figure 1. Real Exchange Rate and Current Account Balance, 1973–2004weighted value of the dollar; this was not the case when the Smithsonian
Agreement was abandoned and the regime of ﬂoating exchange rates
began in 1973. Between 1995 and 2005 the renminbi’s weight in the Fed-
eral Reserve trade-weighted RER index of the dollar rose from 5.7 per-
cent to 11.4 percent, and the Mexican peso’s from 7.0 percent to 10.0
percent. Meanwhile the yen’s weight declined from 16.5 percent to 10.6
percent. In fact, the trade-weighted RER of the dollar is dominated today
by the Asian nations, which (excluding India) have a combined weight in
the index of 38.8 percent. The currencies of commodity-exporting coun-
tries, as a group, are also very important, with a weight of 24.6 percent.
Finally, the launching of the euro in 1999 has marginalized the British
pound: although its weight of 5.2 percent is still quite respectable, the
pound is no longer among the top ﬁve currencies in the index. The situa-
tion was quite different in 1998, when the pound had a higher weight
than the currencies of all but one of the countries that would eventually
adopt the euro: in that year the deutsche mark had a weight of 6.4 percent,
and the pound a weight of 5.9 percent.
8
One can distinguish in ﬁgure 1 six distinct phases in U.S. RER behav-
ior for the thirty-two-year period 1973–2004. A summary of these six
phases is also in large measure a summary of the history of the inter-
national ﬁnancial system since the inception of ﬂoating:
9
—Phase I, 1973:1–1978:4. The early years of floating were character-
ized by a depreciating trend for the dollar in real terms, with the decline
in value cumulating to 18.1 percent over the twenty-four quarters. Dur-
ing this period the standard deviation of monthly log differences of the
RER index was 0.0205. During the early part of this phase (1973–76),
the current account was in surplus, but this turned into a small deficit in
1977 and 1978.
—Phase II, 1979:1–1985:1. During the next twenty-ﬁve quarters the
dollar experienced a 49.3 percent appreciation in real terms. Meanwhile the
current account went into deﬁcit, which reached 2.9 percent of U.S. GDP in
1984:4. The standard deviation of monthly log differences of the RER
index was 0.022, slightly higher than in phase I. In view of the dollar’s
strengthening and the related increase in the U.S. current account deﬁcit, on
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8. In 2005 the euro has a weight of 18.8 percent in the Federal Reserve index; in 1995
the currencies that the euro later replaced had a combined weight of 17.3 percent.
9. Figure 1 presents the Federal Reserve’s broad RER index. The same six phases are
also apparent when alternative indexes are used.September 22, 1985, the members of the Group of Five major industrial
countries (the G-5: the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany) agreed to implement concerted and coordinated interven-
tions in the foreign exchange market. As part of this agreement, which
came to be known as the Plaza Agreement, the G-5 countries also commit-
ted themselves to put in place coordinated macroeconomic policies that
would reduce the costs of the global adjustment process.
—Phase III, 1985:2–1988:4. During the period following the Plaza
Agreement, the dollar experienced a rapidly depreciating trend, with a peak-
to-trough change in the index of −28.7 percent. RER volatility increased
substantially during these ﬁfteen quarters: the standard deviation of
monthly log differences of the RER index was 0.0268. The current
account deﬁcit continued to grow, however, until in mid-1987 it stabilized
at around 3.6 percent of U.S. GDP. From that point onward the current
account began to improve, and by 1988:4 the deficit had declined to 
2.4 percent of GDP. On February 22, 1987, the ministers of ﬁnance and
central bank governors of the G-6 (the former G-5 plus Canada) released
a communiqué, which came to be known as the Louvre Accord, declaring
that signiﬁcant progress had been made in achieving global adjustment,
and that “Further substantial exchange rate shifts among their currencies
could damage growth and adjustment prospects in [the G-6] countries.”
The communiqué went on to say that the G-6 “agreed to cooperate closely
to foster stability of exchange rates around current levels.”
10
—Phase IV, 1989:1–1995:2. During the next phase the dollar contin-
ued to depreciate in real terms, but at a much lower rate than in the pre-
ceding phase: during these twenty-six quarters the total real depreciation
was 10 percent. The standard deviation of monthly log differences of the
RER index over this period was 0.0232, and the current account balance
continued to improve, until in 1991:1 the United States posted its ﬁrst cur-
rent account surplus in many years. The current account balance averaged
−1.15 percent of U.S. GDP during this phase.
—Phase V, 1995:3–2002:1. This phase was characterized by a trough-
to-peak real dollar appreciation of 33.4 percent (although, as ﬁgure 1
shows, between 1998:1 and 1999:4 there was a short-lived period of real
depreciation). Interestingly, during this phase RER volatility declined sig-
niﬁcantly: the standard deviation of monthly log differences of the RER
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10. Quoted from the text of the Louvre communiqué, available at www.g8.utoronto.
ca/ﬁnance/fm870222.htm.index was 0.0196. This phase was also characterized by an increasing cur-
rent account deﬁcit: whereas in late 1995 and early 1996 the deﬁcit was
on the order of 1.5 percent of U.S. GDP, by early 2002 it was hovering
just below 4 percent of GDP. In 1999, for the ﬁrst time in many years, the
U.S. federal government posted a budget surplus.
—Phase VI, 2002:2–2004:4. In the most recent (and continuing)
phase, the real value of the dollar has accumulated a 14 percent real
depreciation. The current account deﬁcit has continued to widen, exceed-
ing 5 percent of U.S. GDP toward the end of the sample. RER volatility
has increased slightly: the standard deviation of log differences of the
RER index was 0.0212. Other important macroeconomic developments
during this phase included a worsening of the U.S. ﬁscal position and stiff
increases in the prices of oil and other commodities.
Figure 2 breaks down the U.S. current account balance for 1973 through
2004 into its main components: the balance of trade in goods and services,
the balance of trade in nonﬁnancial services, the income account, and
transfers, all as percentages of GDP on a yearly basis. As the top left panel
shows, large and persistent trade surpluses preceded the era of large cur-
rent account deﬁcits: already in the late 1970s the trade account was nega-
tive, and since mid-1976 it has had only one surplus quarter (1992:2).
11
The top right panel shows that since 1996 the trade surplus in nonfinan-
cial services has declined steadily, so that by 2004 it was only 0.3 percent
of GDP. The income account remains positive, as the bottom left panel of
the ﬁgure shows. The surplus has declined sharply since 1980, but given
that for many years now the U.S. international investment position has
been negative—that is, the United States has been a net debtor—the fact
that the income account is still positive may seem surprising. The reason is
that the return on U.S. assets held by foreigners has been systematically
lower than the return on foreign assets in the hands of U.S. nationals.
Finally, the bottom right panel shows that the transfers account has been
negative in every year except one since 1946. Recently the transfers deﬁcit
has been stable at approximately 0.7 percent of GDP.
Recent Current Account Imbalances
Table 1 presents data on the U.S. current account deﬁcit and its ﬁnanc-
ing for the period 1990–2004. The nature of external ﬁnancing of the
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11. Mann (2004) shows that most of the U.S. trade deﬁcit is explained by deﬁcits in
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.deﬁcit has changed signiﬁcantly in the last few years. Whereas from 1997
to 2000 inﬂows of foreign direct investment (FDI) contributed in an
increasingly important way to ﬁnancing the deﬁcit, net FDI inﬂows fell
sharply in 2001 and have been negative since then. Also, after four years
(1999–2002) in which net equity ﬂows were positive, these became nega-
tive in 2003–04. Table 1 also shows that during 2003 and 2004 the U.S.
current account deﬁcit was fully ﬁnanced through net ﬁxed-income ﬂows
(the sum of the ﬁrst, second, and ﬁfth rows in the table). Ofﬁcial foreign
purchases of government securities—“Change in reserves” in table 1—
played a particularly important role in ﬁnancing the 2003 and 2004 cur-
rent account deﬁcits. A number of analysts have argued that reliance on
foreign central bank purchases of Treasury securities has made the United
States particularly vulnerable to sudden changes in expectations and eco-
nomic sentiments.
12
Current account imbalances are reflected in changes in a country’s
net international investment position (NIIP): deficits result in a deterio-
ration of the NIIP, and surpluses in an improvement. Figure 3 shows
that the U.S. NIIP as a percentage of GDP has become increasingly neg-
ative since the mid-1980s: in 2004 U.S. net international liabilities
reached 29 percent of GDP. An important feature of the U.S. NIIP that
distinguishes it from those of most other countries is that gross inter-
national assets and gross international liabilities are held in different
currencies. Whereas more than 70 percent of gross foreign assets held
by U.S. nationals are denominated in foreign currency, approximately
95 percent of gross U.S. liabilities in the hands of foreigners are denom-
inated in dollars. This means that U.S. net liabilities as a percentage of
GDP are subject to “valuation effects” stemming from changes in the
value of the dollar: a dollar depreciation reduces the value of U.S. net
liabilities; as a result, the deterioration of the U.S. NIIP during 2002–04
was significantly smaller than the accumulated current account deficit
during those two years (table 2).
A key question in current account sustainability analyses—discussed
in detail below—is, What is the “reasonable” long-run equilibrium ratio
of U.S. net international liabilities to GDP? The higher this ratio, 
the greater will be the sustainable current account deﬁcit. According to
some, the current ratio of almost 30 percent of GDP is already excessive;
220 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
12. See, for example, the article by Martin Wolf cited above.others believe that a NIIP-to-GDP ratio of up to 50 percent would be
reasonable.
13
One of the first things that undergraduate students of open-economy
macroeconomics learn is that a country’s current account is equal to the
difference between its national saving and its domestic investment.
Over the years a number of authors have argued that a worsening of a
current account balance that stems from an increase in investment is
very different from one that results from a decline in national saving.
Some have gone as far as to argue that very large deficits in the current
account “don’t matter,” as long as they are the result of increased (pri-
vate sector) investment.
14 As figure 4 shows, the recent deterioration of
the U.S. current account has largely corresponded to a decline in
national saving, and in particular of public and household saving, rather
than a rise in investment. A simple implication of this trend—and one
that is emphasized by most authors—is that an improvement in the U.S.
current account will require not only an RER adjustment, but also an











1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Percent of GDP
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, International Investment Position.
a. Data for 2004 are author's projection.  Direct investment positions are valued at current cost.
Figure 3. Net International Investment Position, 1976–2004
a
13. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) and Mussa (2004).
14. Corden (1994).of current global imbalances will also require a decline in Europe’s and
Japan’s saving rates, or an increase in their investment rates, or some
combination of the two.
The U.S. Current Account Deﬁcit in International Perspective
How large are the recent U.S. current account deﬁcits from a compara-
tive point of view? And how large is the U.S. net international liabilities
position compared with those of other developed countries through his-
tory? The top panel of table 3 presents data on the distribution of current
account balances (as a percentage of GDP) in the world economy, as well
as in six country groups—the industrial countries, Latin America, Asia,
the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe—for 1971 through 2001 and
1984 through 2001. (The data are unweighted averages for each country.)
At almost 6 percent of GDP, today’s U.S. current account deﬁcit is very
large indeed from a historical and international perspective: it is in the top
decile of all the deﬁcits recorded by all industrial countries in the ﬁrst
thirty years of ﬂoating exchange rates.
Since 1971 the United States has been the only large industrial country
that has run current account deﬁcits in excess of 5 percent of GDP. This
reﬂects the unique position of the United States in the international ﬁnan-
cial system: U.S. assets have been in high demand, allowing the United
States to run large and persistent deﬁcits. On the other hand, this fact also
suggests that the United States is moving into uncharted waters. As Mau-
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Table 2. Net International Investment Position and Current Account Balance,
1998–2004
Billions of dollars
Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Net international 900.0 775.5 1,388.7 1,889.7 2,233.0 2,430.7 n.a.
liabilities 
position
Change from 79.3 −124.5 613.3 500.9 343.3 197.7 n.a.
previous year
Current account 209.6 296.8 413.4 385.7 473.9 530.7 665.9
deﬁcit
Valuation changes
a −130.2 −421.3 199.8 115.2 −130.6 −333.0 n.a.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions and International Investment Position.
a. Current account deﬁcit plus valuation changes equals change in net international investment position from previous year.rice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff,
15 among others, have shown, if the
U.S. deﬁcit continues at its current level, in twenty-ﬁve years U.S. net
international liabilities will exceed those recorded by any other country,
as a percentage of GDP, in modern times.
During the last thirty years the only industrial countries to have had
current account deﬁcits in excess of 5 percent of GDP have been small
ones: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Malta, New Zealand, Norway, and Portugal. What is even more striking is
that very few countries, industrial or developing, have had large current
account deﬁcits that lasted for more than ﬁve years. Table 4 lists those
countries that have had “persistently large” current account deﬁcits at
some time during the period 1970–2001. For purposes of this table, I
deﬁne a country as having a “large deﬁcit” if, in any year, its current
Sebastian Edwards 223













Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, International Investment Position.
a. All series are on a net basis.
Figure 4. Investment and Saving, 1970–2003
aaccount deﬁcit exceeded its region’s ninth decile.
16 I then deﬁne a “persis-
tently large deﬁcit” country as one that has at some time had a large
deﬁcit, as deﬁned above, for at least ﬁve consecutive years.
17 The result-
ing list in table 4 is extremely short, and none of the countries listed is
large. This illustrates the fact that, historically, periods of large current
account imbalances have tended to be short lived and have been followed
by periods of current account adjustment.
Table 5 presents data on net international liabilities, as a percentage of
GDP, for a group of industrial countries that have historically had a large
negative NIIP position.
18 The picture that emerges is different from that in
224 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
16. Notice that the thresholds for deﬁning “large” deﬁcits are year- and region-speciﬁc,
with a different threshold for each region each year.
17. For an econometric analysis of the persistence of current account deﬁcits see
Edwards (2004). See also Taylor (2002).
18. Data for the United States are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For the other
countries the data are from the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti data set up to 1997. I have updated
them using national current account balance data. The updated ﬁgures should be interpreted
with a grain of salt, because I have not corrected them for valuation effects.
Table 3. Distribution of Current Account Deﬁcits by World Region, 1970–2001
Percent of GDP
No. of 1st 1st 3rd 9th
Region countries Mean Median decile quartile quartile decile
1970–2001
Industrial countries 22 0.6 0.7 −3.8 −1.6 3.0 4.8
Latin America and 34 5.4 4.1 −2.5 1.1 8.0 16.9
Caribbean
Asia 22 3.0 2.7 −7.1 −0.6 6.3 11.3
Africa 51 6.3 5.3 −3.4 1.2 9.9 16.9
Middle East 12 0.0 1.4 −18.8 −5.0 6.4 13.6
Eastern Europe 25 3.9 3.0 −2.4 0.3 6.1 10.7
All countries 169 3.9 3.3 −5.0 −0.1 7.1 13.1
1984–2001
Industrial countries 25 0.2 0.3 −4.7 −2.3 2.7 4.8
Latin America and 34 5.1 3.7 −2.5 1.1 7.0 17.0
Caribbean
Asia 22 2.2 2.4 −8.0 −1.3 5.9 10.2
Africa 51 5.9 4.6 −3.5 0.9 9.1 16.2
Middle East 12 2.3 1.5 −12.4 −4.0 6.3 14.9
Eastern Europe 25 4.0 3.1 −2.5 0.3 6.6 10.9
All countries 169 3.8 3.0 −4.8 −0.4 6.7 12.9
Source: Author’s calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators.table 4: a number of industrial nations have had—and continue to have—
a signiﬁcantly larger net international liabilities position relative to GDP
than does the United States. This suggests that, at least in principle, the
U.S. NIIP could continue to deteriorate for some time into the future. But,
even if this should happen, at some point the process must come to an
end, and the U.S. position as a percentage of GDP will have to stabilize. It
makes a big difference, however, at what level it does stabilize. For exam-
ple, if, in the steady state, foreigners are willing to hold at most the equiv-
alent of 35 percent of U.S. GDP in the form of net U.S. assets, the United
States could sustain a current account deﬁcit of only 2.1 percent of U.S.
GDP.
19 If, on the other hand, foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets were
to grow to 60 percent of GDP—which, as table 5 shows, is approximately
the ratio of (net) foreign holdings of Australian assets to that country’s
GDP—the sustainable U.S. current account deﬁcit would be 3.6 percent
of GDP. And if foreigners are willing to hold (net) U.S. assets equivalent
to 100 percent of U.S. GDP—the figure that Mussa considered implau-
sible in the statement footnoted above—the sustainable U.S. current
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19. This calculation assumes a 6 percent rate of growth of nominal GDP going forward.
See below for an analytical discussion and the relevant equations.
Table 4. Countries with Persistently Large Current Account Deﬁcits
by World Region, 1970–2001
a














Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years.
a. A persistently large deﬁcit is deﬁned as one that exceeded the ninth decile for the country’s region for
at least ﬁve consecutive years.account deﬁcit could be as large as 6 percent of GDP, or approximately its
current level.20
Since there are no historical precedents for a large, advanced nation
running persistently large current account deﬁcits, it is extremely difﬁcult
to get a clear idea of how foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets will behave
in the future. Given this lack of historical precedent, a reasonable strategy
is to model the RER dynamics to be expected if, as posited by Michael
Dooley and his coauthors,
21 among others, foreigners’ demand for U.S.
assets continued to increase. This is the approach followed in the next
section.
The Analytics of Current Account 
and Real Exchange Rate Adjustment
The current account and the RER are endogenous variables jointly
determined in a general equilibrium context. The key question is how
these two variables will move in response to a given exogenous shock—a
decline in capital inﬂows, say—if the other main variables, including eco-
nomic growth and the rate of unemployment, do not deviate signiﬁcantly
from their long-term equilibrium paths. A number of authors have recently
addressed this issue using a variety of simulation and econometric models.
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Table 5. Net Stock of Liabilities in Selected Industrial Countries, Selected Years
Percent of GDP
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Australia n.a. n.a. 47.4 55.1 65.2 59.1
Canada 34.7 36.3 38.0 42.4 30.6 20.6
Denmark n.a. n.a. n.a. 26.5 21.5 13.0
Finland 14.6 19.0 29.2 42.3 58.2 35.9
Iceland n.a. n.a. 48.2 49.8 55.5 66.0
New Zealand n.a. n.a. 88.7 76.6 120.8 131.0
Sweden n.a. 20.9 26.6 41.9 36.7 26.5
United States −12.9 −1.3 4.2 6.2 14.1 22.1
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions and International Investment Position, various years;
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
20. Mussa (2004).
21. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004a).Most have asked what amount of RER adjustment would be “required” to
achieve a certain current account balance. Among these, some have con-
sidered the case where the deﬁcit is completely eliminated,22 whereas oth-
ers have investigated the reduction of the deﬁcit to a smaller but still
positive level. Appendix table A-1, which summarizes a selection of these
studies, shows that they have used different methodologies and reached
different conclusions.23 All, however, ﬁnd quite large required adjustments
in the trade-weighted value of the dollar.24 The estimates from the studies
summarized in table A-1 are much larger than those discussed in most
investment bank newsletters and in the media.25
A Portfolio Model of the Current Account 
and the Real Exchange Rate
From an analytical perspective the process of current account adjust-
ment may be broken down into two components: the dynamics of changes
in net foreign assets, and the “transfer” associated with changes in a coun-
try’s net foreign assets position. Changes in international investors’ will-
ingness to hold U.S. assets will affect total absorption of saving and
relative prices, including the RER. An increase in foreigners’ rate of accu-
mulation of U.S. assets will allow the United States to increase its absorp-
tion, generating a real appreciation and a current account deﬁcit. In a
similar way, a reduction in the rate at which foreigners accumulate the
country’s assets—or, worse, a reduction in their holdings of domestic
assets—will result in a slowdown or a drop in absorption and a decline
in the relative price of nontradables, that is, a real depreciation. These
changes in absorption and the concomitant adjustment in relative prices
are reminiscent of discussions of the “transfer problem,” which go back at
least to the debates between John Maynard Keynes and Bertil Ohlin dur-
ing the 1920s. In large countries such as the United States, however, the
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22. For example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2004); Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (this
volume).
23. See also the studies by Mann (2003, 2004), which extend her pioneering 1999
model.
24. See, for example, Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (this volume).
25. Although many ﬁnancial market practitioners do believe that the dollar will
weaken, they tend to expect more moderate adjustments. See, for example, the forex publi-
cations of some major investment banks.story is more complex. First, as mentioned above, changes in relative
prices have valuation effects on net foreign asset holdings, which will feed
back into the dynamics of net foreign asset accumulation or decumula-
tion.
26 Second, in a large country, changes in aggregate expenditure are
likely to affect the international terms of trade, and thus the general equi-
librium outcome of the original shock.
the basic model. Consider the following barebones portfolio model
of the current account.
27 Equation 1, which is the basic equation for the
external sector (expressed in domestic currency), states that the current
account deﬁcit (CAD) is equal to the trade deﬁcit (TD) plus the income
account (net income payments to the rest of the world, IA) plus net trans-
fers to the rest of the world (NT):
28
The income account, in turn, is equal to
where i is the interest rate paid on (gross) domestic assets in the hands
of foreigners D
t
f, and i* is the interest rate on (gross) foreign assets held
by domestic residents F
t
d. Since equation 1 is expressed in domestic 
currency,
where E is the nominal exchange rate, deﬁned as units of domestic cur-
rency (in this case dollars) per unit of foreign currency, and Ft
d* denotes
(gross) foreign assets held by domestic residents, expressed in foreign
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26. This effect has been emphasized by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2004a, 2004b),
Tille (2003), and Gourinchas and Rey (2005), among others. For a discussion of valuation
effects in the context of current account sustainability in emerging economies, see Edwards
(2003).
27. To concentrate on the problem at hand and to keep the analysis tractable, I have
made a number of simpliﬁcations; I have made no attempt to construct a full general equi-
librium model. Recent papers that have constructed portfolio models of the current account
include Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (this volume), Edwards (1999, 2002), Gourinchas and
Rey (2005), and Kraay and Ventura (2002).
28. I have deﬁned current account balances such that a deﬁcit is a positive number. In
equation 1, then, negative numbers refer to a surplus.where δ is net domestic assets in the hands of foreigners, δt = Dt
f − Ft
d. The
terms iδt and (i − i*)Ft
d capture valuation effects on the current account,
recently emphasized by a number of authors.
29
Equation 2 is a portfolio balance equation that summarizes net inter-
national demand for the domestic country’s assets δt. Domestic and for-
eign assets are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. The variable α is the
share of foreigners’ wealth that they are willing to hold in the form of
the domestic country’s assets; W is world wealth, and W
c is the domestic
country’s wealth. The variable αjj is the domestic country’s asset alloca-
tion on its own assets, that is, the share of their wealth that domestic resi-
dents choose to hold in domestic assets. I assume that there is home bias
in portfolio decisions; this is reﬂected in the fact that α and (1 −α jj) are
below international market shares of domestic and foreign wealth. There
is no need, however, to assume that foreign and domestic investors have
the same degree of home bias. Hence the portfolio balance equation can
be written as
An important question is how the asset allocation shares α and αjj are
determined. Under standard portfolio theory, α and αjj will depend on
expected real returns (i, i*), perceived risk (µ, µ*), and the degree of seg-
mentation of international ﬁnancial markets. Here, however, I make the
simplifying assumption that α and αjj are exogenously determined. This
assumption allows me to focus on the effects of exogenous changes in
portfolio allocations—that is, exogenous changes in α and αjj—on net
asset dynamics and the current account. More speciﬁcally, I consider the
case where changes in α and αjj reduce the initial extent of home bias.
Later I discuss how the results are altered if some degree of substitutabil-
ity between domestic and foreign assets is allowed.
World wealth in foreign currency W* and in domestic currency W are
related by Wt * = Wt/Et. Domestic and foreign interest rates are related by
i = i* + (dE
e/E) + (µ − µ*) + k, where (dE
e/E) is the expected rate of
depreciation of the domestic currency, and k is a term that captures the
effect of capital controls; in a world of perfect capital mobility, k = 0.
() . 21 δα α tt t
c
jj t
c WW W =− ( ) −− ( )
() * , ′ =+ + − ( ) + 1C A D TD NT tt t t
d
t ii i δ F
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29. Including Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004a, 2004b) and Gourinchas and Rey (2005),
among others.Note that in this model “investors” refers both to private and public
investors, including foreign central banks. Indeed, as already pointed
out, recent discussions have emphasized the key role played by foreign
(and especially Asian) central banks in helping finance the U.S. current
account deficit.
The counterpart of a current account deﬁcit is the change in the coun-
try’s (net) assets in the hands of foreigners:
Equation 4 deﬁnes the trade deﬁcit:
where pi
m and pi
x are prices of importables and exportables in domestic
currency; mi is demand for importables, which is assumed to depend on
the real exchange rate e, the international price of importable goods, the
country’s real income y, and other factors, including the degree of trade
protection v. Demand for exports xi, on the other hand, depends on the
RER, the international price of exportables, rest-of-world real income y*,
and other factors u:
Variables mi and xi, in turn, may be interpreted as excess demand for
importables and supply of exportables, respectively, in the domestic
country. The basic version of the model assumes that the law of one price





ever, in the simulation exercises below, alternative assumptions can be
made, including that exporters and importers price to market. Equation 6
is the equilibrium condition for the nontradable goods market in the
domestic country, where St
N is the supply of nontradables in period t,
assumed to depend on the RER and other factors z, and Dt
N is demand for
nontradables:
The domestic price level P is assumed to be a geometric average of the
nominal prices of tradable goods (importables and exportables) and non-
tradable goods:
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where Pt* is the foreign price level. As before, an increase in e represents
a real appreciation.
The interpretation of this model is simple. The domestic country can
run a current account deﬁcit only to the extent that foreign investors are
willing to increase their net holdings of domestic assets—that is, to the
extent that ∆δt > 0. Once ∆δt is known, and for given values of other key
variables, it is possible to derive the real exchange rate e consistent with
the prevailing current account deﬁcit or surplus. A particularly interesting
exercise, given the current U.S. situation, is to analyze how exogenous
changes in portfolio preferences—that is, changes in α, αjj, or both—will
affect the current account and the RER.
Closing the model would require specifying a number of market clear-
ing conditions, including the saving and investment equations for the
world economy; and the world market clearing conditions for each
importable and exportable good. These equilibrium conditions determine
endogenously both interest rates and all relevant tradable goods prices.
Doing this, however, would make the model signiﬁcantly more complex
than is required for dealing with the problem at hand. For this reason I
work with a partial equilibrium version of the model, under alternative
assumptions regarding these variables’ behavior.
30
It is important to emphasize that current account adjustment not only
implies changes in the RER, but also requires changes in saving and
investment in the domestic country (here the United States) and the rest of
the world. From a policy perspective the adjustment in domestic saving
would be greatly facilitated by an increase in public sector saving.
PORTFOLIO EQUILIBRIUM,  DYNAMICS,  AND CURRENT ACCOUNT
SUSTAINABILITY. External sustainability requires that a country’s net
external liabilities stabilize at a level compatible with foreigners’ net
demand for these claims, as speciﬁed by equation 2. On the assumption
that the domestic country’s wealth is a multiple λ of its (potential or full-














30. Most recent models on global imbalances and the U.S. current account have used a
partial equilibrium framework in the simulation phase.employment) GDP, and that its wealth is a fraction β of world wealth W,
it is possible to rewrite (international) net demand for the country’s assets




f* is rest-of-world wealth expressed in foreign currency.
Denoting γ* = [αθ − (1 −α jj)]λ, then δ=γ *Y. This means that in
long-run equilibrium net international demand for the domestic country’s
assets can be expressed as a proportion γ* of its potential or sustainable
GDP. The determinants of this factor of proportionality γ* depend on rel-
ative returns and the perceived risk of the domestic country and of the rest
of the world, as well as on the degree of integration of international ﬁnan-
cial markets.
If g is the country’s sustainable rate of growth and π the country’s
long-term rate of inﬂation, the “sustainable” ratio of the current account
deﬁcit to GDP is given by
Notice that, if [αθ − (1 −α jj)] < 0, domestic residents’ demand for foreign
assets exceeds foreigners’ demand for domestic country assets. Under
these circumstances the country will have to run a current account surplus
in order to maintain a stable net external assets-to-GDP ratio. Most stud-
ies of the sustainability of the U.S. current account have used equations of
this type. Mussa,
31 for example, argues that in long-term equilibrium γ* is
likely to be around 0.50.
32 In long-run equilibrium the sustainable trade
balance will be given by TD/Y = (g − r)γ*, where r is the real interest rate.
In this model, as in earlier models developed by myself and by Aart
Kraay and Jaume Ventura,
33 additional saving will be allocated in a way
that maintains domestic and foreign assets in the same proportion as in
the original portfolio. Kraay and Ventura have shown that models that
combine this assumption with the assumption of transactions costs in
investment go a long way toward explaining international current account
behavior in a large number of countries.
If the degree of perceived riskiness of the domestic country (exoge-
nously) declines, α, and thus γ*, will increase. As a result, the sustainable
() * . 81 CAD/Yg g jj =+ ( ) −− ( )     =+ ( ) πα θ α λ γ π
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31. Mussa (2004).
32. See also Edwards (1995), Ades and Kaune (1997), and O’Neill and Hatzius (2004)
for current account sustainability analyses of this type.
33. Edwards (1999); Kraay and Ventura (2002).current account balance will deteriorate (see equation 9). Equally impor-
tant, changes in portfolio allocation, generated by changes in α or αjj, will
generate a dynamic adjustment process, during which the current account
will differ from its long-run sustainable level. This transitional dynamic
can be incorporated into the model through the following equation:
According to equation 9, short-term deviations of the current account
from its long-run level can result from two forces. The ﬁrst is a traditional
stock adjustment term (γ* t −γ t−1) that captures deviations between the
demanded and the actual stock of the country’s assets in the hands of for-
eign investors. The coefﬁcient ψ is the speed of adjustment, which will
depend on a number of factors, including the degree of capital mobility in
the country in question. The second force affecting this dynamic process,
captured by −κ[(CAD/Y)t−1 − (g +π )γ* t ] in equation 9, is a self-correcting
term, included to ensure that some form of consumption smoothing is pres-
ent. The importance of this self-correcting term will depend on the value
of κ.
34
Whether the dynamic representation in equation 9 is appropriate is, in
the ﬁnal analysis, an empirical matter. As I show below, under certain
parameterizations this model does a very good job at tracking the behav-
ior of the U.S. current account during the last few years. The dynamic
behavior for the net stock of the domestic country’s assets in the hands
of foreigners, as a percentage of GDP, will be given by γt = [γt−1 +
(CAD/Y)t−1](1 + g +π )−1.
Consider the case where for some exogenous reason the home bias in
the rest of the world is reduced—that is, α in equation 2 increases. This
will result in an increase in the sustainable current account deﬁcit (equa-
tion 8). It will also unleash a dynamic adjustment process, captured by
equation 9. During this transitional period the current account deﬁcit will
exceed its new long-run (higher) sustainable equilibrium; that is, the cur-
rent account deﬁcit will overshoot its new sustainable level. During the
transition the trade account will move according to the following equa-
tion: ∆(TD/Y)t =∆ (CAD/Y)t −∆ (iγ* t )−∆ [(i − i*)(F
d/Y)]t −∆ (NT/Y)t. From
() * * 9 1 CAD/ CAD/ Yg Y
t tt t t ( ) =+ ( ) +− ( ) − ( ) − − πγ ψγ γ κ
1 1 −+ ( )     g t πγ *.
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34. If ψ=κ=0, the current account will jump from one sustainable level to the next.
There are many reasons to assume that both ψ and κ are different from zero, including the
existence of adjustment costs in consumption.equations 4 through 6, and after making some assumptions regarding the
behavior of other key variables, such as the international terms of trade
and interest rates, the following equation for the current account may be
derived (to simplify the notation, the mi and xi have been aggregated into
broad import and export categories):
where σm and σx are ratios of imports and exports to GDP; ηe < 0 and εe >
0 are the price elasticities of imports and exports, respectively; ηy and εy *
are the elasticities of imports and exports with respect to domestic and
foreign income, respectively; g and g* represent rates of real GDP growth
at home and in the rest of the world, respectively; π and π* are domestic
and world inﬂation, respectively; p ˆ* m and p ˆ* x are the rates of change in
international prices of imports and exports, respectively; and e ˆ is the
rate of change of the real exchange rate. From this equation it follows
that, in order for a real depreciation to improve the trade balance (and,
other things equal, the current account), it is required that [σx(1 +ε e) −
σm(1 +η e)] > 0.35
Although equation 10 is not a reduced-form equation, it is useful for
undertaking a number of simulation exercises.36 For example, with equa-
tions 2, 3, 9, and 10, and under assumed values for growth, inﬂation, and
interest rates and changes in the international terms of trade, it is possible
to analyze how changes in portfolio preferences will affect the trajectories
of the current account and the RER.
Simulation Results
The barebones model developed above may be used to compute the
current account and RER adjustments consistent with shifts in portfolio
() / 10 ∆∆ ∆ ∆ CAD/Yi i i F Y N
t t
d
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35. Under balanced initial trade, this expression becomes the traditional Marshall-
Lerner condition.
36. In equation 10 I have assumed that di = di* = 0. Since α and αjj are exogenous, this
assumption does not affect the behavior of the RER. Later in the paper I discuss the way in
which changes in interest rates and other variables such as the international terms of trade
affect the results.preferences by foreign and domestic investors, including a reduction in
the home bias in portfolio investment decisions.
37 A ﬁrst step in this
analysis is to calibrate the model. Table A-2 in the appendix presents the
parameter values used in the base-case simulation; most of these values
are taken from existing studies of the U.S. and world economies. I have
selected the values of ψ and κ that best track the actual dynamics of the
U.S. current account between 1996 and 2004; the best results are obtained
for ψ=0.30 and κ=0.20. I also assume that foreigners’ demand α for
U.S. assets increased gradually from 0.205 to 0.300 between 1996 and
2004 (see the values for αHistorical, and αInitial in table A-2). As may be seen
from the top left and bottom right panels of ﬁgure 5, for these parameter
values the model tracks actual current account and RER behavior for
1996–2004 quite closely.
38
One limitation of this type of simulation exercise is that it is difﬁcult to
forecast how foreign investors’ net demand for U.S. assets will behave in
the future. It is precisely for this reason that a number of authors have
avoided the issue and have instead computed the RER adjustment
“required” to eliminate the current account deﬁcit completely.
39 Here I
take a different approach: instead of assuming that the current account
deﬁcit has to be reduced to zero or some other arbitrary number, I analyze
the dynamic of the current account under alternative assumptions regard-
ing foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets. I am particularly interested in
understanding what is likely to happen under an optimistic scenario where
foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets continues to grow. What makes this
approach particularly interesting is the ﬁnding that, even under such a
scenario, it is highly likely that, in the not-too-distant future, the U.S. cur-
rent account will undergo a signiﬁcant reversal.
As table A-2 shows, in these simulation exercises I assume a gradual
portfolio adjustment over the next ﬁve years. I assume that α increases
from its current value of 0.30 to 0.40 by 2010 and that αjj falls from 0.73
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37. In fact, there are indications that the process of international capital market integra-
tion will continue in the future, as some of the largest emerging economies, including
China, are increasingly allowing their nationals to invest abroad. See, for example, “China
to Seek Full Currency Conversion,” Financial Times, February 28, 2005, p. 6.
38. To obtain the best possible historical ﬁt for the model, I incorporated into the his-
torical simulation changes in the terms of trade that track what was observed in 1996–2004.
39. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2004). For similar approaches see Mussa (2004) and





























































































































































































































































































































































sto 0.71 during the same period. This adjustment implies a reduction in
home bias both in the rest of the world and in the United States. In the
base-case scenario the assumed portfolio adjustment is equivalent to for-
eigners doubling their net demand for U.S. assets to an amount equal to
60 percent of U.S. GDP. This is a very large number. Indeed, it implies
that, under the assumptions that g = 0.03 and π=0.023, during the ﬁve
years from 2005 to 2010 the U.S. NIIP will deteriorate by a further 
$5.7 trillion.
Before proceeding, the following assumptions made in the base-case
scenario deserve some comment (see table A-2 for details). First, I
assume that the United States and the rest of the world grow at the same
rate (g = g*). This is consistent with the idea that, while the United States
will grow faster than Europe and Japan, the rest of the world—including
China and India—will continue to grow very rapidly. In a number of
alternative simulations I consider different values for growth. A second
assumption concerns the values of the key elasticities, which have been
taken from existing studies on the U.S. and global economies.
40 Two
important characteristics of these elasticities are that the income elasticity
for U.S. imports exceeds that for imports by the rest of the world (the so-
called Houthakker-Magee phenomenon), and that the RER elasticity of
U.S. imports exceeds (in absolute terms) that of U.S. exports. Finally, in
the base-case scenario I assume that the adjustment has no effect on the
international terms of trade (p ˆ* m = p ˆ* x = 0); in alternative simulations I con-
sider the case where the terms of trade change.
BASE-CASE SIMULATIONS. Figure 5 presents the results of this base-
case exercise. In these simulations, 2005 should be interpreted as the “ini-
tial” period; the previous eight years (the shaded area) represent recent
history. The ﬁgure presents simulation results for the current account, the
trade account, net U.S. assets held by foreigners, and the trade-weighted
RER index (and, for the eight historical years, the actual RER index). The
most salient features of the base-case simulation are the following:
—Under the deliberately optimistic assumption of a signiﬁcant increase
in foreign net demand for U.S. assets, the current account deﬁcit contin-
ues to increase until it peaks at 7.3 percent of U.S. GDP. From that point
onward the deﬁcit declines toward its new steady state of 3.2 percent of
GDP.
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40. See Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000).—Once the current account deﬁcit reaches its peak, the reversal is
quite sharp. In the base-case scenario, during the ﬁrst three years of
adjustment the deﬁcit is reduced by 3.1 percent of GDP. The reversal of
the trade deﬁcit is even sharper. The reason is that, with a larger net U.S.
debtor position, net payments (interest and dividends) to foreign investors
increase signiﬁcantly relative to GDP.
—As the bottom right panel shows, once the process of current account
reversal begins, the trade-weighted RER index falls rapidly: during the
ﬁrst three years of adjustment, the accumulated real depreciation is 13.3
percent. By the time the new, sustainable current account deﬁcit is
reached, the accumulated depreciation amounts to 22.5 percent. This
result is roughly in line with other studies (table A-1). In alternative sim-
ulations in which the valuation effect of dollar depreciation on the U.S.
net foreign asset position is ignored, the resulting real depreciation is
larger: for example, in the ﬁrst three years of adjustment the accumulated
depreciation is 16.8 percent.
—This simulation also indicates that the new steady state is associated
with a sharp depreciation: the RER falls to 19.1 percent below its initial
(2005) level.
Alternative assumptions regarding growth, inﬂation, interest rates, the
terms of trade, elasticities, and other key parameters will, of course, affect
the results. Except when the changes in the assumptions are extreme,
however, the main qualitative result holds: even under very optimistic
assumptions regarding foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets, the current
account deﬁcit is likely to go through a large reversal in the not-too-dis-
tant future.
ALTERNATIVE PORTFOLIO CHOICES. An important question is how 
sensitive these results are to portfolio choices. To explore this issue, 
I report in ﬁgure 6 results from a second simulation exercise, which
assumes that, after increasing their net holdings of U.S. assets to 60 per-
cent of U.S. GDP by 2010, foreign investors make a new portfolio adjust-
ment and gradually reduce their desired holdings of U.S. assets to 
50 percent of U.S. GDP. (The bottom left panel of the ﬁgure depicts the
trajectory of net foreign holdings of U.S. assets in this simulation.) As
the figure shows, in this case the current account reversal is signifi-
cantly more abrupt, as is the depreciation in terms of the trade-weighted
RER index. In the ﬁrst three years of the adjustment, the current account
deﬁcit declines by 5.3 percent of GDP, and the accumulated depreciation

































































































































































































































































































































































sis 23.7 percent. Moreover, as the top right panel of the ﬁgure shows, by
the third year of the adjustment (2011 in the simulation), the trade deﬁcit
has turned into a surplus. It is important to keep in mind that this simula-
tion still assumes that the long-run net demand by foreigners for U.S.
assets is still signiﬁcantly higher—20 percent of GDP higher, to be pre-
cise—than today. Because of space considerations, I have not presented
the results of more pessimistic scenarios in which foreigners reduce their
net demand for U.S. assets below the current level. Sufﬁce it to say that in
those scenarios the current account reversal is even more pronounced, as
is the concomitant real depreciation.
DOES ADJUSTMENT NEED TO BE ABRUPT? The results presented in ﬁg-
ures 5 and 6, and in particular the abrupt current account reversal that
takes place after the deﬁcit peak is reached, depend on the assumptions
made about parameters ψ and κ; different values of these parameters
would result in different dynamics. For instance, if in the future the
dynamic of the adjustment process changes, such that ψ declines while κ
increases, this would result in a more gradual convergence of the current
account deﬁcit to its new, sustainable level. To take a concrete example,
values of ψ=0.20 and κ=0.35 would result in an accumulated compres-
sion of the current account of 1.9 percent of GDP during the ﬁrst four
years of the adjustment process. This is a signiﬁcantly less drastic adjust-
ment than the 6 percent of GDP obtained in ﬁgure 6, and it shows that an
abrupt collapse in the deﬁcit is not unavoidable. Furthermore, in this sim-
ulation the current account deﬁcit would peak at 6.2 percent of GDP
(results not shown) rather than at 7.3 percent as in ﬁgure 6.
The process of net accumulation of U.S. assets by foreigners may also
differ from what I have assumed in both simulations. For instance, if they
slow their accumulation of U.S. assets, or if they stretch the process over
a longer period, the eventual adjustment would be less abrupt than is
depicted in ﬁgures 5 and 6. The real depreciation of the trade-weighted
dollar might also be less pronounced. This would be the case, for exam-
ple, if U.S. saving were to increase in the next few years, moving closer
to its historical average. In that case expenditure reduction would play 
a more significant role in the adjustment, and expenditure switching
(through dollar depreciation) would be less important.
The simulations discussed above assumed an exogenously given rate
of growth of GDP. This, of course, need not be the case in reality. It is
likely, in fact, that current account reversals of the type and magnitude
240 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005Sebastian Edwards 241
41. See the pioneering study on current account reversals by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin
(2000). See also Edwards (2004).
42. Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000, p. 303).
43. Frankel and Cavallo (2004).
suggested by the simulation results will have an effect on real economic
activity.
41 In the next section I use a new, comparative cross-country data
set to investigate the real consequences of current account reversals in
the world economy since 1971. This comparative analysis will help give
some idea of the possible effects of a U.S. current account reversal like
that in the simulations in ﬁgures 5 and 6.
How Costly Are Current Account Reversals? 
An International Comparative Analysis
The main message of the simulation exercises just presented is that,
even under optimistic scenarios where foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets
increases signiﬁcantly, the U.S. current account experiences a signiﬁcant
reversal in the not-too-distant future. But what will be the nature of the
adjustment process? I address this issue here by analyzing the interna-
tional experience with current account reversals in the period 1971–2001.
Although the U.S. case is unique, both because of the size of its economy
and because the dollar is the world’s main vehicle currency, an analysis
of the international experience will shed some light on the likely nature of
the adjustment. A particularly important question is whether this adjust-
ment will entail real costs in the form of slower (or negative) growth
and higher unemployment. Previous studies have generated conﬂicting
results: after analyzing the evidence from a large number of countries,
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin conclude that major current
account reversals have not been costly: “reversals,” they claim, “are not
systematically associated with a growth slowdown.
42 Jeffrey Frankel and
Eduardo Cavallo, on the other hand, conclude that sudden stops of capi-
tal inflows (a phenomenon closely related to reversals) have resulted in
growth slowdowns.




—the relationship between reversals and sudden stops of capital
inﬂows
—the relationship between reversals and depreciation
—the factors determining the probability of a country experiencing a
reversal, and
—the costs, in terms of slower growth, of reversals.
In analyzing these issues I rely on two complementary statistical
approaches: First, I use nonparametric tests to analyze the incidence and
main characteristics of current account reversals. Second, I use panel
regression-based analyses to estimate the probability of a country experi-
encing a reversal, and the cost of such a reversal in terms of a short-term
decline in output growth. Although the data set covers all regions of the
world, in an effort to shed light on the U.S. case, I emphasize the experi-
ence of large countries.
45
Current Account Reversals during 1971–2001: 
The International Evidence
I use two deﬁnitions of current account reversals: I deﬁne a type I
reversal as a reduction in the current account deﬁcit of at least 6 percent of
GDP within a three-year period, and a type II reversal as a reduction in the
current account deﬁcit of at least 4 percent of GDP in one year. (In both
cases the reversal is recorded as occurring in the year when the episode
ends. For example, if a country’s current account deficit declined by 
7 percent of GDP between 1980 and 1982, the episode is recorded as
having taken place in 1982. Also, for an episode to count as a current
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44. In Edwards (2004) I used a smaller data set to investigate reversals in emerging
economies. In that paper, however, I did not consider the experience of large or industrial
countries with reversals. I also used a very simple framework for analyzing growth. In con-
trast, in this section I use a two-step dynamic of growth approach.
45. Croke, Kamin, and Leduc (2005) recently analyzed the nature of current account
adjustments in industrial economies. Their analysis differs from mine in several respects.
First, they concentrate on milder current account adjustments; second, their sample
includes only industrial countries; and, third, they are interested in analyzing whether there
is likely to be a “disorderly” adjustment, deﬁned as a situation of ﬁnancial disruption.Sebastian Edwards 243
46. These definitions differ somewhat from those used in other studies, including
Freund (2000), Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), Edwards (2002), and Guidotti, Villar, and
Sturzenegger (2003).
47. Notice that it is possible for a country to have experienced both a type I and a type
II reversal during the same historical episode.
account deﬁcit reversal, the initial balance has to be indeed a deﬁcit.46)
Thus, in a type I reversal, the magnitude of the adjustment is more pro-
nounced than in a type II reversal but is distributed over a longer period.
47
Table 6 presents data on the incidence of both types of reversal for
the complete sample of countries as well as for each of the six groups 
of countries considered in the previous section. For the overall sample the
incidence of type I reversals is 9.2 percent, and that of a type II reversal 
is 11.8 percent. The incidence of reversals among the industrial countries
is much smaller, however, at 2.7 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively.
Indeed, the Pearson χ
2 and F tests reported in table 6 indicate that the
hypothesis of equal incidence of reversals across regions is rejected
strongly.
The industrial countries that experienced type I current account rever-
sals during the period are Finland (in 1978 and 1994), Greece (1988),
Ireland (1984), New Zealand (1977–78 and 1988–89), Norway
(1979–80, 1989, and 2000), and Portugal (1979 and 1984–85). Those
that experienced type II reversals are Austria (1982), Canada (1982),
Greece (1986), Iceland (1983 and 1986), Ireland (1975), Italy (1975),
Malta (1997), New Zealand (1978), Norway (1989), and Portugal
(1982–83 and 1985). With the exception of Italy and Canada, all of these
countries are economically very small, underlining the point that there
are no historical precedents of large countries undergoing profound cur-
rent account adjustments. As pointed out above, this implies that the
results reported here on current account reversals should be interpreted
with a grain of salt and should not be mechanically extended to the case
of the United States.
The analysis presented above distinguished countries by their stage
of development and world region. An alternative way of dividing the
sample, and one that is particularly relevant for deriving lessons for 
the United States, is by economic size. I define “large” countries as
those whose GDP placed them in the top 25 percent of the sample distribu-
tion in 1995 (by this criterion there are forty-one “large” countries in the
sample). For the period 1971–2001 the incidence of type I reversalsamong large countries is 5.3 percent, and that of type II reversals is 
6.8 percent.
Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops of Capital Inﬂows
In the last few years a number of authors have analyzed episodes of
sudden stops of capital inﬂows into a country.48 From an analytical per-
spective, sudden stops and current account reversals should be closely
related phenomena, but there is no reason for them always to occur
together. Indeed, because of changes in international reserves, it is per-
fectly possible for a country to suffer a sudden stop without simultane-
ously experiencing a current account reversal. However, in countries with
ﬂoating exchange rates, changes in international reserves tend to be rela-
tively small, and, at least in principle, the relationship between sudden
stops and reversals should be stronger.
To investigate formally the relationship between these two phenom-
ena, I deﬁne a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major reduction in
capital inﬂows to a country that until that time had been receiving large
volumes of foreign capital. Speciﬁcally, I impose the following criteria:
capital inﬂows into the country in question during the two years preceding
244 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
48. See Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004); Edwards (2004).
Table 6. Incidence of Current Account Reversals by World Region, 1970–2001
Percent
a
Type I reversal Type II reversal
Region or country group No reversal Reversal No reversal Reversal
Industrial countries 97.3 2.7 98.0 2.0
Latin America and Caribbean 92.0 8.0 87.7 12.3
Asia 88.3 11.7 87.7 12.3
Africa 88.3 11.7 83.4 16.6
Middle East 86.6 13.4 85.0 15.0
Eastern Europe 90.7 9.3 88.9 11.1
All countries 90.8 9.2 88.2 11.8
Summary statistics
Uncorrected Pearson χ
2 (5) 37.31 67.42
Design-based F test (5, 12,500) 7.46 13.08
P-value 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years.
a. Number of reversal episodes divided by the product of all countries in the group and all years, times 100.Sebastian Edwards 245
49. To check the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative deﬁnitions of sud-
den stops, which considered a reduction in inﬂows of 3 and 7 percent of GDP in one year.
Detailed results using these deﬁnitions are not reported here.
the episode must have been larger (relative to GDP) than those of three
quarters of the countries in its region; and net capital inﬂows must have
declined by at least 5 percent of GDP in the year of the episode itself.
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Table 7 presents summary statistics, for three country samples, on the
coincidence of sudden stops and current account deﬁcit reversals (under
both deﬁnitions of the latter). The ﬁrst sample consists of large countries,
deﬁned, as stated above, as those whose GDP is in the top quartile of the
sample distribution; the second consists of industrial countries only; and
the third is the complete sample. The bottom panel of the table shows, in
the ﬁrst column, that 21.1 percent of all countries experiencing a sudden
stop also faced a type I current account reversal, and 15.0 percent of those
with type I reversals also experienced (in the same year) a sudden stop.
The bottom panel also shows, in the second column, that 51 percent of all
countries subjected to a sudden stop faced a type II current account rever-
sal, and that 26.7 percent of those experiencing a type II reversal also suf-
fered (in the same year) a sudden stop. The χ
2 tests indicate that in both
cases the hypothesis of independence between reversals and sudden stops
is rejected. The data for the industrial countries show that the joint inci-
dence of type I reversals and sudden stops is rather low for this group. In
fact, according to the χ
2 test, the null hypothesis of independence between
the two phenomena cannot be rejected. The relationship between sudden
stops and type II reversals, however, is somewhat stronger than for type 
I reversals among this group: the hypothesis of independence is rejected
(χ
2 = 23.6; p = 0.00). The results for large countries are similar to those
for industrial countries.
An analysis of the lead-lag structure of reversals and sudden stops
suggest that sudden stops tend to occur either before or at the same time
(during the same year) as current account reversals. Indeed, a series of
nonparametric χ
2 tests rejects the hypothesis that current account rever-
sals precede sudden stops (results not shown).
Current Account Reversals and the Exchange Rate
An important policy question—and one that is particularly relevant for
the current policy debate in the United States—is whether current accountreversals have historically been associated with unusually large depreci-
ations. The starting point for my analysis of this issue is the construction
of an index of “external pressures” along the lines suggested by Barry
Eichengreen and others:
50
where ∆E/E is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, ∆R/R is
the rate of change of international reserves, and σE and σR are the standard
deviations of changes in the RER and in international reserves, respec-
tively. Traditional analyses deﬁne a crisis to have occurred when It
exceeds the mean of the index plus k standard deviations. My crisis indi-
cator Ct thus takes a value of 1 (crisis) or zero (no crisis) according to the
following rule:
51
() , 11 IE E R R tE R =− () ( ) ∆∆ σσ
246 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
50. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996).
51. The pioneering work here is that by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), who
suggested that the index (equation 11) also include changes in domestic interest rates. The
original index, however, has limited use in broad comparative analyses, because most
emerging and transition economies do not have long time series on interest rates. For this
reason, most empirical analyses are based on a restricted version of the index such as
equation 11.
Table 7. Conditional Incidence of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops 
of Capital Inﬂows, 1970–2001
Percent
Country sample and event
a Type I reversal Type II reversal
Large countries
Reversal Sudden stop 9.3 25.5





Reversal Sudden stop 5.0 18.2





Reversal Sudden stop 21.1 51.0




Source: Author’s calculations from data in World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years.
a. x|y denotes the probability of x occurring given the occurrence of y in the same year.Using equation 12, I deﬁne two currency crisis indicators: The ﬁrst (crisis
type A) uses the traditional crisis index and assigns Ct a value of 1 when 
k ≥ 3. The second (crisis type B) looks to the nominal exchange rate to
determine the value of Ct. In this case It =∆ E/E, and Ct = 1 if It ≥ mean(It)
+ kσE and 0 otherwise.
In this case the country experiences a large depreciation without a
major loss in international reserves. This indicator is more relevant for the
case of ﬂoating exchange rate countries, where changes in international
reserves are usually minimal.
I computed a number of two-way frequency tables similar to table 7
using both crisis deﬁnitions and both deﬁnitions of current account rever-
sals. I also performed χ
2 tests for independence of occurrence of these
phenomena. Table 8 presents data on the shares of current account rever-
sals of both types that are accompanied by crises. Results are presented
for the same three samples as above: large countries, industrial countries,
and all countries, under three different lag structures (no lag between
reversal and crisis, crisis lagged one period, and crisis lagged two periods
into the reversal).
52 The results suggest that, historically, current account
reversals and currency crises have occurred jointly in a large proportion
of cases. Consider, for example, the case of crisis type A and reversal type
I for the sample of large countries: 26.7 percent of countries with a type 
I reversal experienced a contemporaneous type A crisis; 43.1 percent
experienced such a crisis in the second year of the reversal episode; and
34.5 percent of the reversals were accompanied by a crisis in the third
(and ﬁnal) year of the reversal episode. Table 8 also shows that industrial
countries with reversals tended to experience currency crises during the
initial year of the reversal episode. The table also reports p-values for 
χ
2 tests of the independence of reversals and currency crises; in most
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52. Data on the percentage of crises that also correspond to reversals are available from
the author on request. The results of the χ
2 tests conﬁrm those discussed above. I also used
GDP distributions for other years to deﬁne large countries and obtained similar results.Table 9 presents data on the distribution of exchange rate changes for
countries with type I current account reversals.
53 The top panel reports
results for the nominal exchange rate (relative to the dollar; here a posi-
tive number indicates a depreciation), and the bottom panel for the trade-
weighted RER index. These changes are calculated as the cumulative
exchange rate change for the period from three years before the reversal
to the year of the reversal. For comparison I have also included the dis-
tribution of three-year nominal exchange rate changes for a control group
of countries that did not experience a current account reversal during
1970–2001. The results in the top panel indicate that countries experi-
encing reversals have tended to have significantly larger nominal depre-
ciations than the control group. Consider, for example, the case of large
countries: the average depreciation associated with a reversal episode in
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53. Data on countries experiencing type II reversals are not reported here, but the
results are similar and are available from the author on request.
Table 8. Incidence of Current Account Reversal Associated with Currency Crisisa
Percent of countries with reversal episodes
Reversal and Crisis follows Crisis follows
crisis are reversal by reversal by
contemporaneous one year two years
Type of reversal and Type A Type B Type A Type B Type A Type B
country sample crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis crisis
Type I reversal
Large countries 26.7 16.1 43.1 17.2 34.5 13.8
(0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Industrial countries 6.7 0.0 25.0 12.5 50.0 12.5
(0.49) (0.43) (0.16) (0.10) (0.00) (0.11)
All countries 21.2 9.1 25.6 10.3 22.2 9.8
(0.10) (0.38) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09)
Type II reversal
Large countries 31.2 18.2 42.9 15.6 29.5 12.8
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
Industrial countries 28.6 14.3 35.7 0.0 26.7 6.7
(0.09) (0.07) (0.01) (0.43) (0.11) (0.67)
All countries 20.2 10.0 23.8 11.5 16.7 8.2
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.86) (0.47)
Source: Author’s calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years.
a. Numbers in parentheses are p-values of the χ
2 test.those countries that suffered reversals is 33 percent versus only 9.2 per-
cent for the control group. To test formally whether the nominal exchange
rate behaved differently in reversal and control countries, I performed a
series of nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis χ
2 tests on the equality of the
distribution of the cumulative depreciation. The null hypothesis is that
the data for the reversal countries and those for the control group have
been drawn from the same population. As table 9 shows, in the majority
of cases (two out of three) the null hypothesis is rejected at conventional
levels.
The bottom panel of table 9 presents data for the cumulative change in
the RER for the reversal and the control groups. Large countries experi-
enced a rather small real depreciation on average (1.4 percent) in the
period surrounding a current account adjustment, a result that is not statis-
tically different from that for the control group (p = .12). For the complete
sample the χ
2 test indicates that the treatment and the control groups are
drawn from different populations. Perhaps surprisingly, for the industrial
countries the cumulative average change in the RER is an appreciation,
not a depreciation.
The average accumulated depreciations (both nominal and real) in
the reversal countries reported in table 9 are very small compared with
the “required” depreciations calculated in a number of studies, includ-
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experiencing experiencing Kruskal-Wallis test
Country sample type I reversal reversal (p-value)
b
Nominal exchange rate
Large countries 33.1 9.2 0.00
Industrial countries 18.9 3.2 0.19
All countries 27.5 9.5 0.00
Real exchange rate
c
Large countries −1.4 0.04 0.12
Industrial countries 9.3 1.6 0.55
All countries −4.0 3.6 0.00
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Data are cumulative changes over the three years beginning with the year of the current account reversal.
b. The null hypothesis is that the data from the two samples have been drawn from the same population.
c. A positive number indicates a real appreciation.ing the simulations reported earlier in this paper. Obstfeld and Rogoff,54
for example, estimate that eliminating the U.S. current account deficit
would require a real depreciation of between 16 and 36 percent. Blanch-
ard, Giavazzi, and Sa have done estimates that indicate a required depre-
ciation of the trade-weighted dollar of 40 percent or more.
55 One of many
possible reasons for these differences is that the United States is a very
large country, whereas the countries that have experienced reversals are
much smaller. Also, the elasticities may be different for the United
States than for the average reversal country. Yet another possibility has
to do with the level of economic activity and aggregate demand. Most
recent models of the U.S. current account assume that the economy
stays on a full-employment path. It is possible, however, that countries
that have experienced reversals have also gone through economic slow-
downs, and that a reduction in aggregate demand contributed to the
adjustment effort.
The Probability of Experiencing a Current Account Reversal
To better understand the forces behind current account reversals, I esti-
mated a number of equations on the probability of experiencing a rever-
sal, using panel data and the following empirical model:
Variable  ρjt takes a value of 1 if country j experienced a current
account reversal in period t, and zero if it did not. Whether the country
experiences a current account reversal is assumed to be the result of an
unobserved latent variable ρjt *, which in turn is assumed to depend linearly
on vector  jt. The error term εjt is given by a variance component model:
εjt = vj + µjt, where vj is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with
zero mean and variance σv
2 and µjt is normally distributed with zero mean
and variance σµ
2 = 1. The data set used covers eighty-seven countries for
the 1970–2000 period; data are not available for every country for every
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54. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004).
55. Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (this volume).year, however. See appendix table A-3 for exact deﬁnitions and data
sources.
In determining the speciﬁcation of this probit model, I followed the lit-
erature on external crises and included the following covariates:
56 the one-
year-lagged ratio of the current account deﬁcit to GDP; a “sudden stop”
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the country experienced a sudden stop
in capital inﬂows in the previous year; an index of the occurrence of sud-
den stops in the same region in the same year (to capture the effect of
regional contagion); the one-year-lagged ratio of gross external debt to
GDP;
57 the one-year-lagged rate of growth of domestic credit; the one-
year-lagged ratio of the country’s ﬁscal deﬁcit to GDP; and the logarithm
of the country’s initial GDP per capita. The regressions were performed
with and without the ﬁscal deﬁcit variable for both measures of current
account reversal.
Table 10 presents the results of estimating this variance-component
probit model for a sample of large countries, deﬁned as before. The vast
majority of the coefﬁcients have the expected sign, and most are signiﬁ-
cant at conventional levels. The results may be summarized as follows: A
larger current account deﬁcit increases the probability of a reversal in the
following year, as does a sudden stop of capital inﬂows. Countries with
higher GDP per capita have a lower probability of a reversal. The results
do not provide strong support for the contagion hypothesis: the variable
that measures the incidence of sudden stops in the county’s region is sig-
niﬁcant in only one of the four equations (although its sign is always pos-
itive). There is evidence that an increase in a country’s gross external debt
increases the likelihood of a reversal, and that larger public sector deﬁcits
increase the probability of a type II reversal. Countries with looser mone-
tary policy, as measured by growth in domestic credit, also have a higher
probability of experiencing a reversal. Although the United States is a
very special case, the results reported in table 10 provide some support for
the idea that, during the last few years, the probability of the United States
experiencing a current account reversal has increased. Indeed, the United
States has experienced a steady increase in some important determinants
Sebastian Edwards 251
56. See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), and
Edwards (2002).
57. Ideally, one would want to have data for net debt; however, data on net liabilities
are unavailable for most countries.252 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
of reversals, such as its gross international debt, its ﬁscal deﬁcit, and the
current account deﬁcit itself.
Current Account Reversals and Growth
I investigate next the relationship between current account reversals
and real economic performance, with particular attention to the following
issues: whether, historically, abrupt current account adjustments have had
an effect on GDP growth; whether sudden stops and current account
reversals have had similar impacts on growth; and whether the effects of
reversals depend on the structural characteristics of the country in ques-
tion, including its economic size, its openness to trade, and the extent to
which it restricts capital mobility. In addressing these issues, I emphasize
the case of large countries; as a comparison, however, I also provide
results for the complete sample of large and small countries.
Previous analyses of the real effects of current account reversals have
reached different conclusions. Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, for example,
Table 10. Probability of Current Account Reversals in Large Countries: 
Random-Effects Probit Regressions
a
Type I reversal Type II reversal
Independent variable
b 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4
Ratio of current account deﬁcit 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.19
to GDP (1.65)* (1.63)* (5.46)*** (5.53)***
Occurrence of sudden stop 0.82 0.83 0.93 0.83
in country (2.06)** (2.08)** (2.46)** (2.24)**
Index of sudden stops in region 0.78 0.80 1.42 1.64
(0.66) (0.68) (1.54) (1.84)*
Ratio of external debt to GDP 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
(2.81)*** (2.88)*** (0.29) (0.32)
Domestic credit growth 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.0003
(2.50)** (2.52)** (1.65)* (1.71)*
Ratio of ﬁscal deﬁcit to GDP −0.004 0.05
(0.12) (1.85)*
Initial GDP per capita −0.28 −0.29 −0.15 −0.16
(2.19)** (2.23)** (1.57) (1.66)*
No. of observations 545 582 557 597
No. of countries 36 37 36 37
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. Results obtained from estimating the model in equations 13 and 14 in the text on unbalanced panel data for the sample of large
countries. Numbers in parentheses are z statistics (in absolute value); all equations include country dummy variables, results for
which are not reported. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent levels.
b. All independent variables are lagged one period.used before-and-after analyses as well as cross-country regressions to
address this issue, concluding that “reversal events seem to entail sub-
stantial changes in macroeconomic performance between the period
before and the period after the crisis but are not systematically associated
with a growth slowdown.”
58 On the other hand, in a previous paper I used
dynamic panel regression analysis and concluded that major current
account reversals had a negative effect on investment, and that they had
“a negative effect on GDP per capita growth, even after controlling for
investment.”
59
GROWTH EFFECTS OF CURRENT ACCOUNT REVERSALS AND SUDDEN
STOPS: AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL. The point of departure for the empiri-
cal analysis is a two-equation formulation for the dynamics of real growth
of GDP per capita in country j in period t. Equation 15 is the long-run
GDP growth equation, and equation 16 captures the growth dynamics:
I use the following notation: ˜ gj is the long-run rate of real growth in GDP
per capita in country j; xj is a vector of structural, institutional, and policy
variables (identiﬁed below) that determine long-run growth; rj is a vector
of regional dummies; α, β, and θ are parameters to be estimated; and  j
is an error term assumed to be heteroskedastic. In equation 16, gjt is 
the rate of growth of GDP per capita in country j in period t. The terms vjt
and ujt are shocks, assumed to have zero mean and ﬁnite variance and 
to be mutually uncorrelated. Speciﬁcally, vjt is assumed to be an external
terms-of-trade shock, whereas ujt captures other shocks, including current
account reversals and sudden stops of capital inﬂows. εjt is an error term,
which is assumed to have a variance component form, and λ, ϕ, and γ are
parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the growth
process. Equation 16 has the form of an equilibrium correction model
and states that the actual rate of growth in period t will deviate from the
long-run rate of growth because of the existence of three types of shocks:
vjt, ujt, and εjt. Over time, however, the actual rate of growth will tend to
() . 16 1 ∆gg g v u jt j jt jt jt jt =−     +++ − λϕ γ ε  
() . 15   gjj j j =+ + + αβ θ xr 
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58. Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000, p. 303, emphasis added).
59. Edwards (2002, p. 52). In a recent paper, Guidotti, Villar, and Sturzenegger (2003)
consider the role of openness in an analysis of import and export behavior in the aftermath
of a reversal. See also Frankel and Cavallo (2004).converge toward its long-run value, with the rate of convergence given by
λ. Parameter ϕ in equation 16 is expected to be positive, indicating that an
improvement in the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) accelera-
tion in the rate of growth, and that negative terms-of-trade shocks are
expected to have a negative effect on gjt.60 From the perspective of the
present analysis, a key issue is whether current account reversals and
sudden stops reduce growth; that is, whether coefﬁcient γ is signiﬁcantly
negative. In estimating equation 16 I used dummy variables for sudden
stops and reversals. An important question, addressed in detail below, is
whether the effects of different shocks on growth are different for coun-
tries with different structural characteristics, such as the degree of trade
and capital account openness.
Equations 15 and 16 are estimated using a two-step procedure. In the
ﬁrst step I estimate the long-run growth equation 15 using a cross-country
data set. These data are averages for 1974–2001, and the estimation cor-
rects for heteroskedasticity. These ﬁrst-stage estimates are then used to
generate long-run predicted growth rates to replace gj ~ in the equilibrium
error correction model (equation 16). In the second step I estimate equa-
tion 16 using the generalized least squares (GLS) method for unbalanced
panels; I use both random effects and fixed effects estimation proce-
dures (only the former are reported here). The data are annual data for 157
countries for 1970–2000; data are not available for every country for
every year, however. (See appendix table A-3 for exact data deﬁnitions
and sources.)
In estimating equation 15, I followed the standard literature on growth,
as summarized by Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Jeffrey Sachs
and Andrew Warner, and David Dollar, among others.61 I assume that
the long-run rate of growth of GDP ˜ gj depends on a number of structural,
policy, and social variables: the equation includes the logarithm of ini-
tial GDP per capita, the investment ratio, the secondary education cover-
age rate (as a proxy for human capital), an index of the degree of
openness of the economy to trade and capital flows, the ratio of govern-
ment consumption to GDP, and regional dummies. The results obtained
from these first-stage estimates are not reported but are available upon
request.
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60. See Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (forthcoming) for details.
61. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995); Sachs and Warner (1995); Dollar (1992).Sebastian Edwards 255
62. In the analysis that follows, and in order to focus the discussion, I concentrate on
the effects of current account reversals.
Table 11 presents the results of the second-stage estimation of the
growth dynamics equation (equation 16), using random effects. The top
panel reports results for the sample of large countries, and the bottom
panel for the complete sample. The equations whose results are reported
in columns 11-1 and 11-2 include the type I and type II reversal dummies,
respectively. Column 11-3 includes the sudden stops indicator and neither
reversal dummy. Columns 11-4 and 11-5 include both the sudden stops
indicator and the type I or the type II reversal variable, respectively, as
regressors.
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The results in table 11 may be summarized as follows: The estimated
coefﬁcient on the growth gap is, as expected, positive, signiﬁcant, and
smaller than 1. The estimates are on the high side (between 0.66 and
0.72), suggesting that, on average, deviations between long-run and actual
growth get eliminated rather quickly. For instance, according to the
results in column 11-1, approximately 85 percent of a shock to real
growth in GDP per capita will be eliminated within three years. Also, 
as expected, the estimated coefﬁcients on the terms-of-trade shock are
always positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that an improve-
ment in the terms of trade results in an acceleration, and a deterioration
in a deceleration, in the rate of growth of real GDP per capita. As may
be seen from columns 11-1 and 11-2, the coefficients on both the cur-
rent account reversal variables are significantly negative, indicating 
that reversals result in a deceleration of growth. For large countries
these results suggest that, on average, a type I reversal is associated with
a reduction of GDP growth by 2.1 percentage points. This effect is elim-
inated gradually as g converges toward ˜ gj. In the case of type II rever-
sals, the estimated negative effect on GDP growth is even larger, at 
−4.1 percentage points. The results in column 11-3 show that countries
that have experienced a sudden stop of capital inflows have also tended
to experience a reduction in GDP growth: for large countries the point
estimate is −2.4 percentage points. This is the case whether or not the
country in question has also suffered a current account reversal. The equa-
tions reported in the last two columns in table 11 include both the current
account reversal (type I or type II) and sudden stop indicators. The
results in column 11-5 suggest that higher costs of adjustment have been256 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005




independent variable 11-1 11-2 11-3 11-4 11-5
Large countries
Growth gap
b 0.67 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.71
(21.20)*** (25.33)*** (22.82)*** (20.54)*** (24.60)***
Change in terms of 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10
trade (7.88)*** (10.30)*** (7.99)*** (7.34)*** (9.52)***
Type I current  −2.12 −2.11
account reversal (3.94)*** (3.89)***
Type II current  −4.13 −3.74
account reversal (9.34)*** (7.94)***
Sudden stop of −2.36 −2.39 −1.37
capital inﬂows (3.99)*** (3.99)*** (2.36)**
Constant −0.28 −0.21 −0.31 −0.18 −0.18
(2.10)** (1.70)* (2.36)** (1.36) (1.39)
No. of observations 799 846 811 764 810
No. of countries 41 41 41 41 41
Adjusted R
2 0.41 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.50
All countries
Growth gapb 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82
(40.26)*** (42.10)*** (40.18)*** (38.93)*** (40.76)***
Change in terms of 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
trade (11.77)*** (12.65)*** (11.31)*** (11.10)*** (12.18)***
Type I current  −1.04 −0.73
account reversal (3.00)*** (2.03)**
Type II current  −2.01 −1.80
account reversal (6.64)*** (5.50)***
Sudden stop of −1.23 −1.02 −0.53
capital inﬂows (2.82)*** (2.28)** (1.19)
Constant −0.30 −0.15 −0.27 −0.26 −0.14
(2.26)** (1.16) (2.62)*** (2.33)** (1.32)
No. of observations 1,723 1,821 1,641 1,546 1,635
No. of countries 90 90 81 81 81
Adjusted R
2 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.51
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. Results obtained from estimating the model in equations 15 and 16 in the text on unbalanced panel data. The dependent variable is
the change in the growth rate of GDP per capita (in percentage points). Numbers in parentheses are t statistics (in absolute value); all
regressions include country dummy variables, results for which are not reported. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the ***
1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent levels.
b. Difference between estimated long-run and actual annual growth rates of real GDP, in percentage points.
associated with type II reversals: the coefﬁcient on the type II dummy
variable is more than twice as large (in absolute terms) as that on the sud-
den stop variable in the same equation. According to this equation, coun-
tries that have experienced both a reversal and a sudden stop experienced,Sebastian Edwards 257
63. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004); Frankel and Cavallo (2004); Edwards (2004).
64. The use of gravity trade equations to generate instruments in panel estimation was
pioneered by Jeffrey Frankel. See, for example, Frankel and Cavallo (2004).
65. Edwards (forthcoming).
on average, a decline in growth in GDP per capita of 5.1 percentage
points.
To summarize, the results presented in table 11 are revealing and cast
some light on the likely costs of a future current account reversal in the
United States. Historically, large countries that have suffered such rever-
sals have experienced deep reductions in GDP growth. These estimates
indicate that, on average, and with other factors unchanged, the decline in
growth in GDP per capita has been in the range of 2.1 to 4.1 percentage
points in the ﬁrst year of the adjustment. Three years after the initial
adjustment, GDP growth will still be below its long-run trend.
EXTENSIONS, ENDOGENEITY, AND ROBUSTNESS. Here I discuss some
extensions of the model and examine the robustness of the estimates,
including possible endogeneity bias. Speciﬁcally, I address the role of
countries’ structural characteristics in determining the costs of adjustment,
present results from instrumental variables GLS regressions with random
effects, and consider the effects of changes in the terms of trade.
Openness and the costs of adjustment. Recent studies on the econom-
ics of external adjustment have emphasized the role of openness to trade.
Guillermo Calvo, Alejandro Izquierdo, and Luís-Fernando Mejia,
Frankel and Cavallo, and I, among others, have found that countries that
are more open to international trade tend to incur a lower cost of adjust-
ment to a current account reversal.
63 These studies, however, do not dis-
tinguish between large and small countries or between openness in the
trade account and openness in the capital account. To investigate whether
openness has historically affected the cost of external adjustment in large
countries, I added two interactive regressors to equation 16: the ﬁrst inter-
acts the reversal indicator with trade openness, and the second with an
index of the country’s degree of international capital mobility. Trade
openness is proxied by the ﬁtted value of the ratio of imports plus exports
to GDP obtained from a gravity model of bilateral trade.
64 The index on
international capital mobility is one that I developed in a previous paper;
65
the index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher numbers denoting greater cap-
ital mobility. The results, presented in table 12, show that the coefﬁcients258 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
on the reversal indicators continue to be signiﬁcantly negative, as they
were in table 11. The coefﬁcient that interacts trade openness with the
presence of a type I reversal is signiﬁcantly positive in columns 12-1 and
12-2 in table 12. The point estimate in both is 0.27, indicating that exter-
nal adjustment is less costly in countries with higher trade ratios. How-
ever, the coefﬁcient that interacts trade openness and the dummy for
reversals is not signiﬁcant when the type II reversal indicator is used. The
coefﬁcient that interacts capital account openness and reversal is not sig-
niﬁcant in any of the regressions.
Endogeneity and instrumental variables estimates. The results dis-
cussed above were obtained using a random-effects GLS procedure for
unbalanced panels, and under the assumption that the reversal variable is
exogenous. However, whether a reversal takes place may be affected by
Table 12. Impact of Trade Openness and Capital Mobility on Growth in Large Coun-
tries: Random-Effects GLS Regressions
a
Independent variable 12-1 12-2 12-3 12-4
Growth gap
b 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68
(21.17)*** (21.12)*** (22.35)*** (22.40)***
Change in terms of trade 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
(7.78)*** (7.83)*** (8.77)*** (8.79)***
Type I current account reversal −3.48 −3.84
(1.98)** (4.42)***
Type I current account reversal × 0.27 0.27
trade openness indicator (2.47)** (2.55)**
Type I current account reversal ×− 0.007
capital mobility indicator (0.24)
Type II current account reversal −1.92 −4.12
(1.83)* (7.94)***
Type II current account reversal ×− 0.02 −0.04
trade openness indicator (0.58) (1.27)
Type II current account reversal ×− 0.05
capital mobility indicator (1.70)*
Constant −0.28 −0.29 −0.16 −0.16
(2.14)** (2.19)** (1.26) (1.27)
No. of observations 794 793 793 793
No. of countries 41 41 41 41
Adjusted R
2 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.43
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. Results obtained from estimating the model in equations 15 and 16 in the text on unbalanced panel data, with the addition of
the variables interacting current account reversals with trade openness and capital mobility indicators. The dependent variable is
the change in the growth rate of GDP per capita (in percentage points). Numbers in parentheses are t statistics (in absolute value);
all regressions include country dummy variables, results for which are not reported. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent levels.
b. Difference between estimated long-run and actual annual growth rates of real GDP, in percentage points.the country’s growth performance, and thus endogenously determined. To
deal with this issue I reestimated equation 16 using an instrumental vari-
ables GLS panel procedure. The following instruments were used: the
one- and two-period-lagged ratio of the current account deﬁcit to GDP; a
lagged sudden stop dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the country
experienced a sudden stop in the previous year; the same regional conta-
gion variable used in the previous analysis; the one-year-lagged ratio of
external gross debt to GDP; the one-year-lagged ratio of net international
reserves to GDP; the one-year-lagged rate of growth of domestic credit;
and the logarithm of initial GDP per capita. As the results in table 13
show, the coefﬁcients on the reversal indicators are signiﬁcantly negative,
conﬁrming that, historically, current account reversals have had an
adverse effect on growth. The absolute values of the estimated coefﬁ-
cients, however, are larger than those obtained with the random-effects
GLS procedure (top panel of table 11).
Terms-of-trade effects. The estimation that yielded the results in
table 11 controlled for terms-of-trade changes. That is, the coefﬁcients on
the type I and II reversal variables capture the effect of a current account
reversal with the terms of trade held constant. As discussed above, how-
ever, external adjustment in large countries is very likely to affect the
terms of trade. The exact nature of that effect will depend on a number of
factors, including the relevant elasticities and the extent of home bias in
consumption. To get an idea of the effect of current account reversals
when international prices are allowed to adjust, I reestimated equation 16
excluding the terms-of-trade variable for the sample of large countries.
The full results are not reported here, but the estimated coefficients on
the reversal variables were smaller in absolute terms than those in table
11: −2.43 versus −2.12 in table 11 for type I reversals, and −3.63 versus
−4.13 for type II reversals. These results suggest that, for this sample,
external adjustment has been associated, on average, with an improve-
ment in the international terms of trade.
Robustness tests and other extensions. To test the robustness of the
results, I also estimated several alternative versions of equation 16 for the
sample of large countries. In one of these exercises I introduced lagged
values of the reversal indicators as additional regressors. The results (not
reported here) indicated that lagged values of these indexes were not sig-
niﬁcant at conventional levels. I also varied the deﬁnition of “large coun-
tries,” but this likewise did not dramatically affect the results.
Sebastian Edwards 259Concluding Remarks
The results reported in this paper illustrate the uniqueness of the cur-
rent U.S. external situation. Never before in modern economic history has
a large industrial country run persistent current account deﬁcits of the
magnitude posted by the United States since 2000. This development can
be explained in the context of a portfolio model of the current account,
where, for a number of reasons—the end of the Cold War, the Internet
revolution, and the liberalization of international capital movements in
most countries—foreign investors have increased their (net) demand for
U.S. assets. Indeed, by increasing their holdings of U.S. assets to 30 per-
cent of their wealth, foreigners have provided American residents with
sufﬁcient funds to run the large current account deﬁcits of the last few
years.
The future of the U.S. current account—and thus of the dollar—
depends on whether foreign investors will continue to add U.S. assets to
their investment portfolios. As a way of sharpening the discussion, I have
deliberately made a very optimistic assumption, namely, that during the
260 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
Table 13. Impact of Current Account Reversals on Growth in Large Countries:
Instrumental Variables Regressions
a




Change in terms of trade 0.06 0.11
(3.87)*** (6.86)***
Type I current account reversal −9.40
(4.55)***




No. of observations 514 538




a. Results obtained from estimating the model in equations 15 and 16 in the text on unbalanced panel data using an instru-
mental variables GLS procedure. The instruments used were the one- and two-period-lagged ratio of the current account deﬁcit
to GDP; a lagged sudden stop dummy equal to 1 if the country experienced a sudden stop in the previous year; the regional sud-
den stop index used in table 10; the one-year-lagged ratio of external gross debt to GDP; the one-year-lagged ratio of net inter-
national reserves to GDP; the one-year-lagged rate of growth of domestic credit; and the logarithm of initial GDP per capita.
Numbers in parentheses are t statistics (in absolute value); all regressions include country dummy variables, results for which
are not reported. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent levels.
b. Difference between estimated long-run and actual annual growth rates of real GDP, in percentage points.next ﬁve years foreigners’ net holdings of U.S. assets, as a proportion of
U.S. GDP, will double from their current level. The simulation model
indicates that, even under this optimistic assumption, in the not-too-
distant future the United States is likely to go through a signiﬁcant exter-
nal adjustment. Indeed, one cannot rule out a scenario in which the U.S.
current account deﬁcit shrinks abruptly by 3 to 6 percent of GDP. Accord-
ing to the simulations, this type of adjustment would imply a cumulative
real depreciation of the trade-weighted dollar in the range of 13 to 23 per-
cent during the ﬁrst three years of the adjustment.
To obtain an idea of the possible consequences of this type of adjust-
ment, I analyzed the international evidence on current account reversals.
The results of this empirical investigation indicate that major current
account reversals have been associated with large declines in GDP
growth: In large countries, with other factors unchanged, the decline in
growth in GDP per capita has averaged in the range of 2.1 to 4.1 percent-
age points in the ﬁrst year of the adjustment. Three years after the initial
adjustment, GDP growth is still below its long-run trend.
The results presented in this paper are revealing and suggest that the
United States is likely to experience a major adjustment in the not-too-
distant future. However, many questions are still unresolved and will
require additional research. These include the following:
—How does the behavior of foreign central banks, including their
future demand for U.S. assets, affect the likelihood and magnitude of a
U.S. current account reversal? A particularly important question involves
the appropriate international reserves policy for central banks in a world
where most exchange rates have at least some ﬂexibility. A number of
analysts are concerned that the Asian central banks will reduce their
demand for U.S. assets, unleashing an abrupt collapse in the value of the
dollar.
—How exactly does the adjustment process work in large countries?
Although I have concentrated on a group of countries that I deﬁned as
“large,” in fact all of the countries in my sample that have experienced
current account reversals have much smaller economies than the United
States. In particular, more analysis is needed of the consequences for
global interest rates of a major U.S. current account adjustment.
—How do nominal exchange rates behave in a current account adjust-
ment episode? Most models of the U.S. current account imbalance,
including the portfolio model presented here, have focused on the RER.
Sebastian Edwards 261262 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
However, estimating the way in which the adjustment process will affect
nominal exchange rates is not a trivial matter. The actual adjustment in
nominal exchange rates will depend on pass-through coefﬁcients, as well
as on the exchange rate policies followed by some important U.S. trade
partners, including China, Japan, and other Asian countries.
—Finally, how does private sector saving, and in particular household
saving, behave in the United States? To the extent that household saving
increases—as a result of a decline in home prices, for instance—the cur-
rent account deﬁcit will decline without putting pressure on the value of
the dollar. Likewise, if saving in foreign countries declines, the current
account surplus in the rest of the world will also tend to decline, helping
to achieve global balance. Of course, what matters for current account
behavior is aggregate national saving. Therefore the behavior of public
sector saving is a fundamental variable for future current account and real











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































World wealth in 2005
U.S. wealth in 2005
Foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets in (early)
2005a
U.S. residents’ demand for U.S. assets in
(early) 2005
Foreigners’ portfolio allocation to U.S. assets
in 2010. An alternative simulation
assumes that, after reaching 0.40, α
declines gradually to 0.365 in 2014.
U.S. residents’ demand for U.S. assets in
(early) 2010. An alternative simulation
assumes that, after reaching 0.71, αjj rises
to 0.72 in 2014.
Foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets in (early)
1996. The move to the “initial” current value
of 0.30 is assumed to have been gradual.
U.S. residents’ demand for U.S. assets in
(early) 1996
Wealth-to-GDP ratio
Value of [αθ − (1 −α jj)]λ in (early) 2005
(see text)
Value of [αθ − (1 −α jj)]λ in 2010
Value of [αθ − (1 −α jj)]λ in 1996
Assumed long-term sustainable annual rate of
growth of U.S. GDP
Annual growth rate of rest-of-world GDP
(including emerging economies as well as
Europe and Japan)
Long-term annual rate of U.S. inﬂation
Long-term annual rate of foreign inﬂation;
some simulations used a value of 0.03.
Long-term real U.S. interest rate; some simula-
tions used a value in the range 0.05 to 0.065.
Long-term real rest-of-world interest rate;
some simulations used values in the range
0.06 to 0.075.
Price elasticity of U.S. imports; this is
slightly below the consensus value; a range
of values was used in other simulations.
Table A-2. Parameter Values for Variables Used in the Simulations
Parameter 





































Table A-2.  Parameter Values for Variables Used in the Simulations (continued)
Parameter 










Real exchange rate elasticity of U.S. exports
(approximately the consensus value); sensi-
tivity analyses used a range of 0.2 to 0.6.
Consensus value for income elasticity of U.S.
imports
Consensus value for income elasticity of U.S.
exports
Share of imports as a fraction of U.S. GDP in
2004
Share of exports in U.S. GDP in 2004
Rate of change in world price of imports; in
alternative simulations a range of −0.05 to
−0.10 was used.
Rate of change in world price of exports; in
alternative simulations a range of 0.05 to
0.07 was used.
Coefﬁcient measuring rate of adjustment
from actual to demanded asset stock; value
chosen to obtain best possible ﬁt for
1996–2004.
Coefﬁcient measuring rate of adjustment of
absorption to change in income; value cho-
sen to obtain best possible ﬁt for
1996–2004 period.
Source: Author’s model described in the text.
a. The adjustment period for α and αjj is assumed to be ﬁve years.Table A-3. Variable Deﬁnitions and Data Sources
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Type I current account 
reversal
Type II current account 
reversal
Sudden stop
Type A currency crisis
Type B currency crisis
Nominal exchange rate
Real exchange rate
Reduction in an existing cur-
rent account deﬁcit by at
least 6 percent of GDP
over three years.
Reduction in an existing cur-
rent account deﬁcit by at
least 4 percent of GDP in
one year
Reduction in net capital
inflows by at least 5 per-
cent of GDP in one year.
The country must have
received an inflow of cap-
ital larger than its region’s
third quartile during the
preceding two years.
Dummy variable equal to 1
when an index of external
pressures exceeds its mean
by 3 standard deviations
Dummy variable equal to 1
when an index of external
pressures exceeds its mean
by 3 standard deviations
exclusively through
changes in the nominal
exchange rate
Dollars per local currency
unit
Bilateral real exchange rate
calculated using consumer
price indexes in both
countries
Author’s determination based




























nominal exchange rate and
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Ratio of reserves to GDP
Domestic credit growth
Ratio of external debt to 
GDP
Ratio of ﬁscal deﬁcit to 
GDP
GDP per capita
Index of capital mobility
Trade openness indicator
Table A-3.  Variable Deﬁnitions and Data Sources (continued)
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Change in capacity to
import for a given amount




Growth rate of domestic
credit in percent a year
Total external debt divided
by GDP
Overall government budget
deﬁcit divided by GDP
Real GDP per capita in 1995
dollars
Index from 0 to 100, with
higher values indicating
greater capital mobility
Exports plus imports divided
by GDP
World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators
World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators
World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators
World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators
World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators
World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators
Edwards (forthcoming)
World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators
Sebastian Edwards 271Comments and 
Discussion
Kathryn M. E. Dominguez: The U.S. current account deficit at the end
of 2004 reached 5 percent of GDP, a remarkably high number and far
outside the experience of any other large developed country. This paper
by Sebastian Edwards examines the factors that have led to such a large
imbalance, attempts to forecast how long deﬁcits of this magnitude can be
sustained, and analyzes the likely near-term consequences for the U.S.
economy of a reversal of the current account balance.
Current account deﬁcits have been the norm for the United States for
some twenty-ﬁve years, just as surpluses have been the norm for many
developing countries and many of the rest of the world’s developed coun-
tries. In theory a deﬁcit, even if persistent, is not necessarily cause for
concern. A country can ﬁnance deﬁcits only if the world perceives it to be
a good credit risk. Indeed, the reason many developing countries are forced
to run surpluses is that they lack access to deﬁcit ﬁnancing. So, if the world
has been willing to ﬁnance U.S. current account deﬁcits for over a quarter
of a century, why the concern?
Edwards makes the case that the reason for concern is that the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcit is not sustainable: the world will not be willing to con-
tinue to ﬁnance U.S. deﬁcits on the current scale into the future. He argues
further that, even if net demand for U.S. assets continues to increase, a
current account reversal is inevitable, which in turn will result in a signif-
icant reduction in U.S. growth. If Edwards’s predictions are accurate, the
implications for the U.S. economy are quite bleak.
I will begin by discussing some of the underlying factors that have led
to the recent large U.S. current account deﬁcits, and which are likely to
inﬂuence the future path of global imbalances. Next I will raise some dis-
agreements with some of the assumptions made in the portfolio balance
272model used by Edwards to simulate U.S. current account dynamics into the
future. I will then discuss whether evidence from smaller countries regard-
ing the links between current account reversals and economic growth is
relevant for the U.S. situation. Finally, I will return to Edwards’s predictions
about the likely downturn for the U.S. economy in light of the evidence from
the data and the model.
Edwards’s ﬁgure 1, which graphs the U.S. current account balance and the
dollar real exchange rate since 1973, provides some historical context and
shows the close association of dollar appreciations and U.S. current account
deﬁcits. His table 1 shows that the sources of ﬁnancing for these deﬁcits
have changed signiﬁcantly over the past few years. In particular, foreign
direct investment and other equity ﬂows, which were important in the
1990s, have been replaced with net ﬁxed-income ﬂows, consisting largely
of purchases of U.S. Treasury securities by foreign central banks. This shift
in ﬁnancing has had the favorable consequence (from the point of view of
the U.S. income account) of U.S. investors receiving higher returns on the
foreign assets they hold than foreigners have received on their U.S. assets.
In addition, because the bulk of U.S. liabilities held by foreigners are denom-
inated in dollars, whereas the bulk of foreign assets held by U.S. investors
are denominated in foreign currency, the recent dollar depreciation has
led to positive valuation effects, which, in turn, have improved the U.S.
net international investment position.
An examination of the factors driving the movements in these data is war-
ranted, especially if these factors are expected to persist. In this context it is
interesting to contrast the role of exchange rate policies in the 1980s with that
in the more recent period. In the mid-1980s several foreign countries joined
with the United States in coordinated interventions to bring down the value
of the dollar and correct global imbalances. In the more recent period there
has been no such coordinated attempt on the part of the United States or the
rest of the world to intervene against the dollar. Quite the opposite: central
banks in Asian countries have been intervening to support the value of the
dollar relative to their own currencies, by building dollar reserves to the tune
of about $2 trillion. China alone holds around $610 billion in dollar reserves
and Japan $840 billion. Their purchases of low-return U.S. Treasury securi-
ties have sustained and indeed ampliﬁed global imbalances by serving to
both ﬁnance the U.S. deﬁcit and maintain a high value of the dollar.
Edwards discusses this role of foreign central banks in sustaining the
U.S. deﬁcit in the context of the United States’ increasing vulnerability to
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ers. An alternative view is that, if the Asian central banks come to believe
that it is in their best interests to help correct global imbalances, they can
look to the policies followed by central banks in the 1980s to help bring
about an orderly change in the value of the dollar.
Another issue that is little discussed in the paper, but is clearly a driving
force behind the current global imbalances, is differences in economic
growth rates. The U.S. economy in the 1990s sustained the longest expan-
sion in its recorded history. At the same time, Europe and Japan largely
experienced at best lackluster growth. These growth differentials affected
the U.S. current account balance in two ways. First, faster relative U.S.
growth led to higher aggregate demand in the United States for both domes-
tic products and imports, relative to foreign demand for U.S. products.
Second, because the U.S. economy was booming in both absolute and com-
parative terms, global investors were attracted to U.S. assets, which in turn
helped ﬁnance the deﬁcit and maintain a strong dollar. Any future changes
in growth differentials are similarly likely to affect the size and sustain-
ability of the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
Edwards’s ﬁgure 4 shows U.S. investment and saving rates since 1970.
What is striking is how different today’s saving rates look relative to his-
torical norms. In the past decade and especially in the last few years, the net
household saving rate has been unusually low. This, combined with the
dramatic fall in net public saving in recent years, has reduced total U.S.
saving to its lowest level in a quarter of a century. Investment in recent
years has also been relatively low, although well within the range of his-
torical norms during periods of slow growth. A country’s current account
deﬁcit, of course, equals the difference between saving and investment, and
if we believe that the U.S. saving rate will eventually revert to historical
norms, this provides additional reason for optimism that the current account
deﬁcit will improve.
Edwards introduces a partial equilibrium version of a simple portfolio
balance model of the current account to simulate how potential changes in
the world’s appetite for U.S. assets will inﬂuence current account and real
exchange rate adjustment. A number of the simplifying assumptions implicit
in the model are likely to have important implications for the results. In
particular, relative asset allocation shares (the shares of their wealth that
foreign and U.S. investors allocate to foreign and domestic assets) are
assumed to be exogenously determined and subject to home bias. The model
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cation preferences will inﬂuence the current account. In his base-case
simulation, Edwards assumes that foreign net holdings of U.S. assets rise
to 60 percent of U.S. GDP by 2010 (starting from 30 percent at the end of
2004), that the U.S. economy and the rest of the world economy grow at
the same rate, that the U.S. saving rate remains at its current low level,
that the income elasticity for U.S. imports is higher than for rest-of-world
imports, and that the international terms of trade remain unchanged. The
key result is that, even given the assumed doubling in foreign demand for
U.S. assets, the U.S. current account deﬁcit will eventually decline to a
steady state of 3.2 percent of GDP, with a relatively sharp reversal occur-
ring in 2007, bringing about a 3 percent of GDP reduction in the deﬁcit in
three years. The accumulated real dollar depreciation over this period is
22.5 percent.
The virtue of Edwards’s model is its simplicity. It allows the reader to
easily follow the mechanics of how a change in portfolio preferences inﬂu-
ences all the other key variables (net assets held by foreigners, the trade
balance, the real exchange rate, and the international wealth transfer associ-
ated with these changes). The problem with the model is that its assump-
tions more or less guarantee the main result, namely, that even with an
increase in foreign holdings of U.S. assets, the U.S. current account will
experience a sharp reversal. Edwards brieﬂy discusses how a relaxation of
some of his assumptions would likely inﬂuence (and in most cases soften)
his most dire predictions, but the main message remains that a reversal is
inevitable.
The ﬁnal section of the paper uses cross-country evidence to estimate the
likely costs of a U.S. current account reversal in terms of growth and employ-
ment. The analysis involves examining the incidence of current account
reversals since 1970 for various categories of countries, the correlation of
reversals and sudden stops in capital inﬂows, the correlation of reversals
and exchange rate changes, and, ﬁnally, the correlation of reversals and
GDP growth rates. Edwards is candid about a serious problem with this
analysis: since the United States is unique both because of its size and
because of the role of the dollar in the global economy, it is not clear that
the cross-country evidence marshaled here has any relevance for the United
States. Indeed, Edwards ﬁnds no historical examples of large countries
that have experienced a large current account reversal along the lines pre-
dicted by his portfolio balance model.
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even if its relevance to the U.S. experience is uncertain. The international
evidence suggests that current account reversals, especially when combined
with sudden stops in capital inﬂows, result in signiﬁcant reductions in rates
of GDP growth. It is certainly hard to argue that a dramatic fall in the cur-
rent account deﬁcit could occur without major economic dislocation in any
country, including the United States. What is less clear is whether the United
States is likely to experience a dramatic current account reversal or a sudden
stop in capital inflows. Indeed, the fact that many of the factors driving
the large current account deﬁcit are unusual relative to historical (or inter-
national) norms suggests that predicting future dynamics based on recent
experience may not be appropriate.
Does an exit strategy exist for the United States that would allow it to
forestall a sharp current account reversal? This question evokes a whole
series of related questions that seem worth considering before coming to
any conclusions about the future course of the U.S. economy. How might
a rise in U.S. interest rates (which would likely both attract more foreign
investment and decrease the U.S. income account) muddy the waters? Might
higher interest rates, in turn, inﬂuence household saving rates? Will the
U.S. government continue to run large budget deficits, and, if so, might
U.S. households turn Ricardian and save more? Might an internationally
coordinated intervention strategy to gradually lower the value of the dollar
work to improve global imbalances? How might an increase in rest-of-world
growth rates (or a fall in U.S. growth rates) inﬂuence trade and investment
patterns?
In summary, Edwards has provided a stimulating paper that argues plau-
sibly that the U.S. current account deﬁcit is both unsustainable and likely to
lead to a fall in U.S. economic growth. This conclusion relies on the
assumption that many of the key U.S. and foreign macroeconomic variables
will continue along their course of the past few years. Time will tell
whether or not this assumption is a valid one. Given the rather bleak impli-
cations of Edwards’s analysis, my hope is that the data prove him wrong.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas: Sebastian Edwards has written an ambitious
paper on an important topic. The paper starts with a thirty-year perspective
on U.S. current account developments. It introduces and calibrates a port-
folio balance model designed to help in understanding the developments of
recent years. It then uses the model to project the adjustment path for the
276 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005dollar’s real exchange rate and the U.S. current account. Finally, it discusses
the growth implications of current account adjustment in light of the expe-
rience of other countries.
I cannot stress enough the importance of the topic: few macroeconomic
questions are as pressing today as that of the sources and the implications
of growing world external imbalances,
1and few issues are receiving as much
attention from academics and policymakers alike. In that respect the paper
stands resolutely on the alarmist side of the current debate, claiming that
the U.S. external position is not sustainable. Even under optimistic assump-
tions about foreigners’ appetite for U.S. assets, the paper ﬁnds, “the [U.S.]
current account will have to go through a significant adjustment in the
not-too-distant future.” This adjustment would not be immediate, but it
would be dramatic when it arrives: the benchmark projection ﬁnds that the
current account deﬁcit ﬁrst increases to 7.3 percent by 2009, then experi-
ences an abrupt reversal that brings it down to 3.2 percent by about 2018.
Such a reversal in the current account would be accompanied by a sharp
real depreciation of the dollar of 22.5 percent once the correction begins.
Finally, the paper argues, a current account reversal of this magnitude is
also typically associated with a signiﬁcant slowdown in economic activity.
READING THE TEA LEAVES. The paper starts with a thorough analysis
of the buildup in U.S. external imbalances. Like other papers before it,2 it
emphasizes two important elements of the current situation. First, the source
of ﬁnancing of the current account deﬁcit has shifted away from foreign
private investors to foreign central banks, and away from equity and direct
investment to ﬁxed-income vehicles, especially U.S. Treasury securities.
Second, the deﬁcit has been associated in recent years with a decline in U.S.
national saving, especially household and public saving. Since the ﬁnanc-
ing of the deﬁcit by foreign central banks does not reﬂect market forces, it
follows that U.S. households and government are artiﬁcially living beyond
their means. This interpretation, shared by many commentators, puts the
blame squarely on U.S. domestic factors. The willingness of Asian central
banks, concerned about the value of their currency against the dollar, to
ﬁnance the deﬁcits only serves to maintain the gravity-defying properties
of the deﬁcits and of the dollar exchange rate and makes the U.S. position
more vulnerable.
Sebastian Edwards 277
1. See Rajan (2005).
2. For example, Roubini and Setser (2004).Although this is a compelling story, it is possible to construct a differ-
ent reading of the situation. First, the decline in national saving can be an
equilibrium outcome, without any shift in the U.S. saving schedule. In fact,
if the main impetus behind the current imbalances were a decline in U.S.
saving, those imbalances should be associated with high world real interest
rates. This was the case in the early 1980s in the United States, the period
of so-called twin deﬁcits.
Yet what do we observe? According to the Federal Reserve, the ten-year
yield on Treasury inﬂation-indexed securities has declined from 2.29 percent
in January 2003 to 1.63 percent in February 2005. An appealing solution
to what has become known as Greenspan’s conundrum was put forth by
Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke.
3 He observes that the combina-
tion of large deﬁcits and low real interest rates could be the result of a shift
in the net saving schedule of the rest of the world, through either reduced
foreign investment or increased foreign saving (the saving glut hypothesis).
This shift could be a consequence perhaps of the recent current account
reversals in Asia as well as the growth slowdown in Europe.
It is also instructive to analyze the sources of ﬁnancing of the U.S. deﬁcits.
As mentioned above, a common interpretation, shared by this paper, is
that the current account is increasingly ﬁnanced through reserve accumu-
lations. I want to argue that the picture is quite different when one consid-
ers gross ﬂows together with net ﬂows (table 1). Edwards emphasizes that
net foreign direct investment and equity ﬂows for the United States turned
negative in 2003–04. Hence the net ﬁnancing had to have come from net
reserves and net debt accumulation. Yet consider gross equity and direct
investment liability ﬂows in the table. After a decline between 2000 and
2003, these ﬂows increased again in 2004, from $37.3 billion to $56.2 bil-
lion for equities and from $39.9 billion to $115.5 billion for direct invest-
ment. What this means is that the negative net ﬂows come from the larger
U.S. gross purchases of equity ($93 billion in 2004) and direct invest-
ment ($248.5 billion). The increase in gross U.S. foreign liabilities totaled
$1.4 trillion in 2004. This total capital inﬂow helped ﬁnance a $666 billion
current account deﬁcit and $818 billion in foreign asset acquisition by U.S.
investors (with a $52 billion statistical discrepancy). There is really no mean-
ingful way in which the $358 billion in net reserve accumulation has to have
served to ﬁnance the current account deﬁcit. One could just as accurately
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3. Bernanke (2005).say that it served to ﬁnance the $248.5 billion in foreign direct investment
acquisitions by U.S. ﬁrms. In fact, as my ﬁgure 1 shows, although the share
of ofﬁcial ﬂows into the United States has recently increased dramatically,
from about zero to 25 percent of foreign-owned assets in the United States,
this follows just as dramatic a collapse, from 25 percent to –5 percent
between 1996 and 1998.
Figure 1 highlights that ofﬁcial purchases represent—except for the few
years of the equity bubble—a relatively stable share of gross liability ﬂows.
As a rough estimate, foreign ofﬁcial assets provide at most only a quarter
of the total capital inﬂows into the United States.
CURRENT ACCOUNT REVERSALS AND ASSET SUBSTITUTION. The portfolio
balance model developed in the paper predicts large but delayed current
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Table 1. Net and Gross Financial Flows of the United States
Billions of dollars
a
Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Reserves, net −26.7 52.3 42.5 23.1 110.3 250.1 358.1
Foreign private purchases of  28.6  44.5 −70.0 −14.4 100.4 113.4 108.1
U.S. Treasuries
Currency 16.6 22.4 5.3 23.8 21.5 16.6 14.8
Securities, net
b 32.1 182.6 338.0 309.2 301.4 178.6 323.2
Debt, gross assets 22.8 1.9 15.2 −24.5 −33.5 −28.1 −2.2
Debt, gross liabilities 110.7 185.9 267.4 274.4 229.3 213.7 357.9
Net debt 87.8 184.0 252.2 298.9 262.8 241.8 360.0
Equity, gross assets 101.4 114.3 106.7 109.1 17.6 100.4 93.0
Equity, gross liabilities 45.6 112.9 192.5 119.5 56.2 37.3 56.2
Net equity −55.7 −1.4 85.8 10.4 38.6 −63.2 −36.8
Foreign direct  36.4 64.5 162.1 24.7 −62.4 −133.9 −133.0
investment, net
Assets 142.6 224.9 159.2 142.3 134.8 173.8 248.5
Liabilities 179.0 289.4 321.3 167.0 72.4 39.9 115.5
Claims reported by  −15.1 −21.5 31.9 57.6 32.6 55.1 −41.5
nonbanks, net
Claims reported  4.2 −22.0 −31.7 −7.5 66.1 65.2 −15.6
by banks, net
Other −1.2 −2.1 −1.8 −1.6 −0.9 −2.5 −0.2
Net ﬁnancing 75.0 231.7 476.3 415.0 569.0 542.7 614.0
Memoranda:
Current account balance 209.6 296.8 413.4 385.7 473.9 530.7 665.9
Statistical discrepancy 134.6 65.1 −62.8 −29.3 −95.0 −12.0 51.9
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions, table 1.
a. Items may not sum to totals because of rounding.
b. Excluding U.S. Treasury securities.account and exchange rate adjustments. I must admit that I was initially
puzzled by the difference between the estimates of this paper and those
by Olivier Blanchard, Francesco Giavazzi, and Filipa Sa in this volume.
After all, both papers use the same model (in Edwards’s paper, equations 1
through 4) and a similar calibration of the model’s parameters. Both mod-
els emphasize the sort of valuation effects that have received considerable
attention recently.
4 Yet Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa predict a gradual
adjustment of the current account (and a gradual depreciation of the dollar,
cumulating to 54 percent), whereas, as already noted, Edwards predicts that
the current account will keep worsening for the next four years before
reversing sharply between 2009 and 2012.
The answer lies in the speciﬁcation of the asset demand side of both mod-
els. Whereas Blanchard and his coauthors assume that investors’ demand
for assets depends upon the expected excess return (the expected rate of
dollar depreciation when local currency returns are constant and equal),
Edwards assumes that the portfolio shares are exogenous. This is an extreme
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a. Figure reports official purchases as a share of all foreign claims in the United States and as a share of all foreign claims
excluding bank and non bank claims. Bank and nonbank asset and liability claims roughly offset each other.
Figure 1. Share of Ofﬁcial Assets in Total Foreign Purchases of U.S. Assets
aassumption: it implies that there is no substitution between domestic and
foreign assets, regardless of their relative returns.
Edwards assumes that the degree of home bias in investment decreases
exogenously between 2004 and 2010. Crucially, it decreases more for foreign
investors (the share of U.S. assets in foreign portfolios increases from 0.3
to 0.4) than for U.S. investors (the share of foreign assets in U.S. portfolio
increases from 0.27 to 0.29). Abstracting from the short-term dynamics
represented by equation 10, this decline in relative home bias is what sus-
tains the increase in current account deﬁcits for the next four years (top left
panel of Edwards’s ﬁgure 5) and the continued appreciation of the dollar
over the same period (bottom right panel of ﬁgure 5).
But consider what happens when foreigners stop increasing the share
of U.S. assets in their portfolios. At that point the drying up in foreign
ﬁnancing requires a drastic current account reversal, which can only be
triggered by a real dollar depreciation. Hence the predictions of the cur-
rent account reversal in terms of timing and magnitude come mostly from
the assumptions about the path of relative asset shares. The sharp dollar
depreciation that occurs when the adjustment begins delivers crushingly
low returns to foreigners on their U.S. investment. They lose 22 percent in
three years if local currency returns are equal and constant. One would expect
that, faced with such negative excess returns, investors would demand less
U.S. assets today. But a lower demand for U.S. assets today would pre-
cipitate the adjustment in the exchange rate and the current account. This
indicates that the assumption of exogenous portfolio shares, although use-
ful to calibrate and simplify the model, is eventually too extreme.
Besides the assumptions on portfolio shares, the assumption of a com-
mon growth rate in the United States and the rest of the world matters
also.
5 Consider, for instance, what would happen if the rest of the world is
expected to grow faster than the United States. Given stable portfolio shares,
foreigners will want to purchase more U.S. assets as they grow richer. Hence
the supply of foreign capital will not collapse abruptly.
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5. This is especially important when looking at the steady state of the model. In the
benchmark calibration, while the trade deﬁcit stabilizes, the dollar keeps depreciating in
real terms. What is happening is a consequence of the Houthakker-Magee paradox. If the
income elasticity of imports exceeds that of exports, the real depreciation must occur along
a balanced growth path with common growth rates at home and abroad and a stable ratio of
the trade balance to GDP. It is possible to have a stable real exchange rate if the rest of the
world grows faster than the United States (Krugman’s 45-degree rule; Krugman, 1989).CURRENT ACCOUNT REVERSALS AND GROWTH. The last part of the paper
emphasizes that a current account reversal is likely to trigger a growth
slowdown in the United States. This section presents a rich set of empiri-
cal results. This is an area where Edwards has made numerous important
contributions, and I will limit myself to two brief observations. The ﬁrst is
that his projected real depreciation of the dollar does not allow for the
possibility of a U.S. growth slowdown. Yet it is possible that a decline in
output growth would improve the current account, and as imports drop with
domestic income, the residual decline in the real exchange rate should be
comparatively smaller than in the absence of a slowdown.
More important, although I agree with the general conclusion of this
section—indeed, it is hard to see how a current account reversal of the
size that the paper projects could occur without major disruptions in the
U.S. economy—it is important to keep in mind that the U.S. situation is
unprecedented in many ways besides the size of the external deﬁcit. In
particular, never before in peacetime has the center country of the interna-
tional monetary system accumulated net liabilities on such a scale. It is
reasonable to analyze current account reversals for other economies—most
of which are small relative to gross world product—using the small-country
theoretical apparatus. It is more questionable to do the same for the United
States, as Edwards acknowledges. General equilibrium considerations—
already essential in understanding the source of the current account deﬁcit
in the ﬁrst place—are crucial in understanding the possible rebalancing
that needs to occur. World asset and good prices cannot be taken as given.
To conclude, it is the great merit of this paper to offer an ambitious
contribution to the debate on the sustainability and ultimate adjustment in
U.S. external imbalances. The paper’s emphasis on the portfolio alloca-
tion problem is also most welcome.
General discussion: Panel members discussed Edwards’s model’s predic-
tion of a sharp depreciation of the dollar leading to current account reversal
and possible crisis. Olivier Blanchard observed that these predictions
result from the absence of valuation effects and zero substitutability between
domestic and foreign assets in the model. With valuation effects, a smaller
depreciation of the dollar would reduce the share of dollar assets in foreign
portfolios to the level consistent with foreign investors’ preferences. And,
with some substitutability between domestic and foreign assets, the depre-
ciation would likely be much more gradual, starting as soon as investors
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would already have started. Richard Cooper believed the model’s assump-
tion that foreign investors would target a certain share of U.S. assets in
their portfolios was too rigid. Although the assumption of a preference
shift to more dollar assets can explain the recent accumulation, in the sim-
ulations, when the new, preferred portfolio is achieved, the demand for
U.S. assets falls abruptly, leading to a crisis. Cooper suggested that a
more natural baseline might call for some fraction of rest-of-world saving
to be invested in the United States for an extended period, in which case
the model would predict a gradual slowdown in demand for U.S. assets
and a much softer landing.
Peter Garber observed that Edwards’s baseline model does not explain
how the rest of the world would absorb $500 billion of added saving that
would arise from a reversal in the U.S. current account equal to 4 percent
of U.S. GDP. He conjectured that the added saving would feed back into
foreign investors’ behavior, possibly changing the model’s predictions in
a meaningful way. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti said he found it difﬁcult to
judge how far the present, decade-long trend toward greater global diver-
siﬁcation of portfolios would go or how it might end. The world may be
transitioning to a new steady state, but we have little guidance about where
that new steady state will be. This implies that the history of current account
reversals is not a good benchmark for the present U.S. situation, but one
cannot rule out the possibility that some shock will lead to a crisis and
return investors’ behavior to what it was in the 1990s.
Barry Eichengreen questioned the robustness of the paper’s empirical
analysis, comparing it to a similar recent analysis by Hilary Croke, Steven
Kamin, and Sylvain Leduc. Their sample includes more industrialized coun-
tries and a less restrictive deﬁnition of reversal, which leads them to pre-
dict sizable current account reversals in some large countries, including
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Unlike Edwards, how-
ever, they do not ﬁnd large negative output effects associated with reversals,
possibly indicating that large countries are able to adjust more smoothly.
Sebastian Edwards replied that the differences between his results and
those of Croke, Kamin, and Leduc arise from the very mild episodes of
exchange rate adjustment that qualify as reversals in their analysis. He found
it unsurprising that such gradual adjustments are not disruptive.
Hélène Rey professed puzzlement at Edwards’s ﬁnding that a sudden stop
or reversal of capital inﬂows has more pronounced effects the higher the
Sebastian Edwards 283degree of trade openness. Theory, as embodied in the model by Obstfeld and
Rogoff in this volume, holds that a more closed economy requires a larger
relative price adjustment, which suggests that the disruption to the economy
will be more substantial. Believing there might be an omitted-variable bias
in Edwards’s results, she suggested including the degree of liability dollar-
ization, which has been a robust explanatory variable in the sudden stop
literature, as an independent variable. Edwards agreed that his results were
surprising, but he added that, in the sudden stop literature, liability dollar-
ization plays no role in the impact of a sudden stop or reversal, but only
on the probability of their happening. Milesi-Ferretti conjectured that the
reason the empirical analysis found current account reversals not to be
associated with large exchange rate swings is that changes in the terms of
trade are often associated with current account reversals. As examples he
noted that some countries in the sample, such as Norway and New Zealand,
have highly volatile terms of trade. If the price of their exports doubles, their
current account balances improve without a weakening of their currencies.
Several panelists stressed the importance of valuation effects in pre-
venting the U.S. net debt position from increasing substantially in recent
years. Cooper pointed out that, in 2003, the U.S. current account deﬁcit
reached $530 billion, yet the U.S. net asset position declined by only $98
billion. The valuation effects that account for this difference are due both
to exchange rate effects and to differing returns on foreign and domestic
gross portfolios. Richard Portes observed that the depreciation that con-
tributed to these valuation effects cannot go on forever. Milesi-Ferretti added
that, to the extent valuation effects from differences in asset returns hold
up the dollar, the trade deficit will grow faster, requiring a larger depre-
ciation eventually.
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